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Introduction This case study focuses on two challenges of the developing world: the provision of effective and sustainable solid waste management services, and the improvement of conditions  in  the  informal  sector.  Internal  and  structural  issues  typically  prevent institutions in developing countries from adequately delivering basic services (Joshi, 2008). Such obstacles include corruption, a lack of adequate employee training and incentives,  and  the  decentralization  of  responsibility  to  local  government without also allocating sufficient authority (Joshi, 2008). This paper broaches both topics by examining  the  case  of  an  innovative  municipal  solid  waste  management  solution that integrates the lowest on the informal sector waste management hierarchy into the  formal  system  while  substantially  improving  their  incomes  and  working conditions in enduring ways. Historically,  the  State  has  been  responsible  for  the  provision  of  public  goods  and services. But since the 1980s proponents of market‐based reforms have questioned the  State’s  role  as  sole  provider.  Calling  for  a  greater  involvement  of  the  private sector,  they  argue  that  competition  will  promote  service  efficiency  (see  the  New Public  Management  literature,  especially  Hood,  1991,  for  a  summary  of  these arguments).  While  the  controversy  over  whether  privatization  or  pluralization actually  improves government  functions  is ongoing,  one documented drawback of this  approach  is  that  market  competition  often  reduces  social  accountability  and social equity in public services (Joshi, 2008).  However,  effective  and  socially  equitable  service  provision  is  central  to  achieving poverty reduction;  ill‐health as a  result of poor or absent services can prompt  the descent  into  poverty,  and  reinforces  vulnerability  and  insecurity  among marginalized  groups  (Joshi,  2008).  At  the  intersection  of  poverty  alleviation interventions and the solid waste management system stands the waste‐picker, or more  specifically,  informal  sector  waste  worker.  She  has  operated  in  India  for generations,  frequently  subject  to  stigma  and  distrust,  despite  the  fact  that  her 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removal  of  a  great  portion  of  recyclable  scrap  from  the  waste  stream  relieves pressure  on  formal  systems  of  waste  transportation  and  disposal  as  well  as  the environment.  “The  attitude  of  the  formal  waste  management  sector  to  informal recycling is often very negative, regarding it as backward, unhygienic and generally incompatible with a modern waste management system” (Wilson et al, 2006, 798). Waste‐pickers  frequently  work  for  10  to  12  hours  at  a  stretch,  are  extremely vulnerable to rent‐seekers such as corrupt public employees and scrap traders, and “[rank] lowest in the urban occupational hierarchy, even within the informal sector” (Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2000,  3638‐3639).  As  one might  anticipate,  waste‐pickers are  most  often  from  the  ‘untouchable’  castes  (Wilson  et  al,  2006).  As  a  recycler operating on a subsistence level, the waste‐picker is undeniably a stakeholder in the municipal response to the critical solid waste management challenges in India and other  developing  countries.  Not  only  does  she  warrant  greater  attention  from  a social policy perspective as an  individual who  is often excluded from public goods and  services,  but  her  role  in  solid  waste  management,  namely  the  important contribution of  recycling, must  also be acknowledged. This begs  the question:  can informal  sector  actors  be  effectively  and  equitably  incorporated  into  superior formal sector waste management solutions? We  have  few  examples  of  successful  and  sustainable  public‐private  solutions  to basic  service  provision  that  achieve  efficiency  as  well  as  social  equity  and accountability.  Though  the  literature  suggests  that  such  partnerships  hold  great potential  in  solid  waste  management,  in  part  because  informal  sector  activity  in recycling  is  so  prevalent,  they  are  difficult  to  achieve  (Ahmed,  Ali,  2004).  One solution suggested by some analysts that appears to bridge the informal and formal sector  in  the  form  of  a  complementary  engagement  of  the  civic  with  the  State  is “coproduction,”  the  transformation  of  inputs  from  individuals  from  distinctly different organizations into goods and services (Ostrom, 1996). There are a variety of ways in which coproduction between the State and civic society can be achieved, such as by sub‐contracting to NGOs or the provision of services by organized citizen groups  or  associations  (Joshi,  Moore,  2002).  Though  the  informal  sector  is 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acknowledged  as  an  important  actor  in  forging  inclusive  governance  systems, successful  instances of the urban poor creating substantial change in collaboration with the State are rare (Harriss, 2006). Furthermore, planners stand to benefit from additional  examples  of  informal  sector worker  organizations  that  exhibit  not  only longevity, but the ability to influence and leverage policy development and market relationships  (Sanyal,  1991).  We  need  explanations  that  explore  in  detail  the organizational  nuances,  such  as  external  as  well  as  internal  relationships  and processes,  which  contribute  to  improved  performance  in  service  provision  by informal  sector workers  and  institutions  in  partnership with  the  State  or  private sector.  This  paper  examines  innovations  in  the  delivery  of  urban  waste  management through a case study of Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (KKPKP), a union of waste‐pickers  based  in  Pune,  and  the  Solid  Waste  Collection  and  Handling Cooperative  (SWaCH), a novel doorstep waste  collection cooperative  that  resulted from  the  union’s  joint  effort  with  Pune  Municipal  Corporation  (PMC).  This collaboration  not  only  reformed  solid  waste  management  and  service  delivery across Pune, but it also improved the lives,  incomes and working conditions of the waste‐pickers themselves, addressing the issues of both poverty and sanitation. As a case  of  two  disparate  institutions  joining  to  create  an  innovative  solution  for improved  service  provision,  their  story  is  a  good  example  of  successful coproduction;  it  is  useful  and  unusual  because  accounts  of  such  partnerships  are seldom  told.  In  examining  the  nascent  cooperative  SWaCH,  its  origins,  logic  and future  challenges,  I  draw  out  lessons  for  planners  strategizing  for  poverty alleviation  and  improved  basic  services.  This  case  study  describes  development processes  that  not  only  confront  solid waste management  issues,  but  the  poverty and insecurity of a highly vulnerable and marginalized urban population. Similarly, this case fills a gap in our understanding of cross‐sectoral partnerships for service provision  as  it  represents  an  arrangement  involving  not  just  the  State  and  the market, or the State and civil society, but segments and components of all three. 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My  central  argument  is  that  this  collaboration  went  forward  primarily  because KKPKP maintained agility and adaptability  in partnering with many organizations, both elite and grassroots, across the divisions of the State, civil society and private sector.  Instead of  committing  to a static model,  the  founders of KKPKP guided  the union  on  a  trajectory  that  involved  forming  relationships  at  various  levels,  while remaining  embedded  and  true  to  the  demands  of  the  union  members.  This commitment was demonstrated by KKPKP’s success in lobbying and advocating for substantial social change while remaining autonomous and flexible. The incremental development over the 20 years of KKPKP’s focused work resulted in the formation of SWaCH, an innovative and pro‐poor solid waste management solution. Passed on, these  same  tactics  of  adaptable  collaboration  and  commitment  to  waste‐picker values  will  likewise  promote  sustainability  of  this  doorstep  collection  service enterprise.  Born  from  a  municipal  partnership  and  fraught  with  controversy, SWaCH  will  also  undoubtedly  encounter  political  and  economic  limitations  and challenges as it extends its reach and services. 
The cast of characters This  story  involves  fourteen  important  actors  and  institutions  that  are  briefly introduced below.  The Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (KKPKP) and its members: This union of waste‐pickers is the core focus of this paper.  Registered in 1993, it has emerged as a leading organization advocating for informal sector waste workers in Pune.  Its constituents  are  mostly  female  and  from  the  ‘untouchable’  castes.  KKPKP  was instrumental  in  creating  a  unique  and  important  partnership  with  the  local municipal government to improve solid waste management processes in the city. SNDT  Women’s  University:  A  local  university  that  incubated  and  supported  the social development project that became the union KKPKP. The Pune Municipal Corporation (PMC): Like most urban local bodies, PMC was by no means a homogenous  institution.  It  contained reformist bureaucrats  interested in achieving social good and improving services as well as officials who opposed the 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incorporation  of  SWaCH.  Many  of  these  individuals,  such  as  PMC  councilors  and employees of the health and solid waste management departments, encountered the challenges  of  informal  sector  integration  and  politically  unpopular  solid  waste management techniques, such as fee‐based services, first hand. SWaCH:  The  cooperative  doorstep‐collection  provider,  staffed  primarily  with members of  the urban poor, which  emerged  from  the  collaboration between PMC and KKPKP to address shortcomings in the formal solid waste management system. A network of NGOs: KKPKP and its activities, including SWaCH, occur in the context of variety of loosely linked NGOs.   A number of local environmental NGOs engaged with KKPKP via its forum for environmental concerns, WasteMatters. Other waste‐picker organizations in India are linked to KKPKP via the National Alliance of Waste‐Pickers. KKPKP also  collaborates with  international NGOs,  the Dalit  Swayamsevak Sangh  (a mass organization  for  ‘dalits,’ or  ‘untouchables’),  and  the  informal  sector labor union of porters, Hamal Panchayat. The  formal  sector  conservancy  workers  union:  Like  KKPKP,  the  organization opposed any privatization of waste services that might displace its members. Other members of the urban poor: Some became workers for SWaCH. The  citizens  of  Pune:  Some were  sympathetic  to  the waste‐picker’s  plight,  though perhaps  more  so  in  the  union’s  early  years.  Many  were  also  discontented  with municipal services. Some citizens opposed a waste collection system that demanded a contribution of either money, such as SWaCH’s doorstep collection fee, or the time and effort of involved in waste segregation. The  village  of  Uruli  Devachi:  Many  of  its  residents,  fed  up  with  the  negative environmental  impacts  from  Pune’s  landfill  sited  nearby,  protested  the  dumping there  vocally,  at  times  halting  operations.  The  urgency  of  the  situation  created  a greater  need  for  the  waste  management  solution  presented  by  SWaCH  from  the perspective of the municipality and the public. 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Large  and  well‐recognized  governance  bodies,  such  as  the  International  Labor Organization and  the All  India  Institute of Local  Self Government: These endowed KKPKP with prominence and stature when they contracted it to provide studies and reports regarding waste‐pickers and their role in solid waste management. Private  sector  interests,  such as  contractors  for  collection,  transport  and disposal: Important stakeholders in the provision of solid waste management services, some have  offered  installation  and  operation  of  Refuse  Derived  Fuel  waste‐to‐energy plants  in Pune. These plants, which turn solid waste into pellets that are then sold and  incinerated  for  energy,  are  frequently  marketed  as  a  ‘panacea’  for  waste quantity and disposal challenges, and potentially exclude programs such as the one created by KKPKP.  One such plant is already operating in Pune. The  Central  Government:  The Ministry  of  Environment  and  Forests  played  a  key role  in  transforming  municipal  waste  collection  and  fostering  integration  of  the informal  sector  in  solid  waste  management  via  the  Municipal  Solid  Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules.  These Rules were established in the year 2000 in  response  to  the  Supreme Court’s  directives  driven  by  Public  Interest  litigation. The Central Government  also  funds  these  same Refuse Derived Fuel  facilities  that seem to threaten to displace waste‐pickers by discouraging recycling and restricting informal sector participation in waste management systems. The State Government of Maharashtra: This body dictated the inclusion of the urban poor  in  formal  solid  waste  management  and  promoted  the  organization  and endorsement of informal sector waste workers. 
Methodology The  bulk  of  my  research  was  undertaken  using  qualitative methods  during  eight weeks in Pune, in India’s State of Maharashtra, in the summer of 2009. I conducted interviews  with  23  individuals  via  a  snowball  sampling  method.  I  interviewed leaders and members of both KKPKP and SWaCH,  faculty at  the Karve  Institute of Social  Service,  the  heads  and members  of  NGOs  in  Pune  and  other  cities  in  India working  to  address  waste  management  and  social  equity,  and  Pune  municipal 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officials  and  select  citizens.  My  research  also  involved  an  extensive  review  of relevant literature. KKPKP has published a number of their own reports and studies, some  commissioned  by  prominent  institutions  in  academia  and  government.  A number of these pieces are referenced. I contextualize this material by drawing on the  theoretical  debates  regarding  the  politics  of  municipal  service  delivery contained  in  the  literature  on  international  development,  poverty  alleviation  and solid waste management  in  developing  countries.  Specifically,  I  critically  examine the  recent  literature  on  decentralization,  privatization,  pluralization,  and  the construction  and  preservation  of  accountability  and  autonomy  in  relationships between civic organizations and the State. 
Organization of the paper In my first chapter,  I begin by examining the origins of KKPKP, and then draw out the most important aspects that enabled its longevity, rapport with key actors, and efficacy  in  social  programs.  The  second  chapter,  focusing more  closely  on  SWaCH and its formation, attempts to explain why the municipal government was willing to enter into a binding agreement with KKPKP and submit financing to create a novel relationship  and  enterprise  with  an  informal  sector  labor  union  famous  for  its demands and single‐minded focus on the advancement of its constituency. The third chapter discusses  challenges  to  the  sustainability of  SWaCH and  the prospects  for meeting  its  goals  in  this  evolving  arrangement  and  changing  environment.  The fourth  and  final  chapter  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  how  the  lessons  of  this unique form of inclusive service provision might be applied more broadly. 
The Pune context Pune, like many Indian cities, is currently grappling with rapid urbanization. With a growing  population  of  nearly  4  million,  a  thriving  IT  sector,  numerous  large academic  institutions,  and  an  active  and  vocal  civic  population  that  includes hundreds  of  NGOs,  Pune  provides  a  striking  context  for  studying  urban  planning issues.  Such issues span a number of challenges, from the provision of basic services such  as water  and  sanitation  in  a  fast‐growing  urban  area,  to  social  development efforts to address the growing number of urban poor living in informal settlements. 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The organization The Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (more commonly known as KKPKP) is a  labor  union  of  informal  sector  recyclers,  or  waste‐pickers,  founded  in  Pune  in 1993. Its membership currently stands at over 6,000 workers. Approximately 92% of waste‐pickers in Pune are women between the ages of 19 and 50 (SNDT, Chintan, 2008,  117),  corresponding  to  the  fact  that  virtually  all  of  KKPKP’s  members  are female. At the time of this writing, KKPKP’s membership constituted approximately 90  percent  of  the  waste‐pickers  in  Pune  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009), demonstrating  the  vast  reach  of  the  organization  among  the  city’s  population  of informal  sector  waste  workers.  The  union  is  globally  recognized  for  its  work  on empowerment and poverty alleviation and belongs to several alliances of  informal sector and environmental advocates across India and internationally.  
Striking achievements Despite this national and global reach, KKPKP focuses its services very locally, on its members and their families, to address the insecurity and vulnerability inherent in the waste‐picker occupation. Members pay an annual membership fee of 20 Rupees (about  .40 USD)  and participate  in  the  organization  at  varying  levels.  The  union’s approach  has  been  to  demand  greater  benefits  and  protections  from  the government as well as  to assist members  in  taking advantage of existing pro‐poor schemes,  for  example,  programs  targeting Below Poverty  Level  households. Many poverty  alleviation  programs  in  developing  countries  in  the  late  1980s  were administered  by  local  NGOs  and  funded  by  donors  in  industrialized  countries.  Unfortunately,  most  of  these  programs  had  little  impact  (Tendler,  1989).  Like poverty alleviation, urban sanitation is a service that presents an ongoing challenge in  the  developing  world  (Ahmed,  Ali,  2004).  KKPKP  stands  out  as  surprisingly successful  not  only  in  contributing  to  sustainable  solid waste management,  but  a 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brief look at its achievements below shows that it has explicitly improved the lives of waste‐pickers and their families, as well. KKPKP  has  instituted  and  sustained  a  number  of  interventions  and  solutions  for poverty among the waste‐pickers in Pune since the early 1990s. First, it became one of  the  first  unions  for  waste‐pickers  in  India  in  1993,  achieving  recognition  of member  ID  cards  from  the  municipality  a  few  years  after.  Through  a  series  of initiatives  it  improved  the  incomes,  livelihoods  and  working  conditions  of  its members. One notable accomplishment was the registration of a savings and credit cooperative,  the  Kagad  Kach  Patra  Nagri  Sahakari  Pat  Sanstha,  in  1997,  which supplies credit to members who deposit savings monthly at interest rates much less than typical informal credit sources—24 percent per annum versus rates as high as 10 percent per day (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2000). In 1998, a cooperative scrap shop was established in the neighboring municipality of Pimpri Chinchwad, operating on a  “no‐profit no‐loss basis”  (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2000, 3642),  and members who sell there receive a bonus at the end of the year. Second, KKPKP instituted a number of  social  insurance  related  programs.  For  example,  it  established  a  jointly  funded health insurance scheme in partnership with the local government. The union also facilitates  an  affordable  group  insurance  scheme  that  protects  members  against death and disability. KKPKP continues to explore ways to improve the waste‐picking occupation as well as enable their members to increase their value added, whether by creating and marketing new waste‐based products, such as envelopes to contain and  demarcate  used  feminine  hygiene  products,  or  acquiring  the  skills  to  offer waste‐based services such as composting (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009). The ongoing success  of  these  programs  sets  KKPKP  conspicuously  above  the  variety  of institutions  attempting  to  do  similar work with  the  urban poor.    This  calls  for  an explanation  of  its  good  performance  and  notable  accomplishments  when  many other organizations have failed to succeed in similar initiatives. 
The creation of the union Though KKPKP was not officially registered as a union until 1993,  the activities of the organization that became KKPKP began in 1990. Its origins lie in a relationship 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between  a  local  university,  SNDT  Women’s  University,  and  Pune’s  waste‐picker population, brokered by two activist‐employees of the university’s Adult Education Department.  KKPKP’s  founders,  Lakshmi  Narayan  and  Poornima  Chikarmane, engaged with local waste‐pickers via a literacy program and through this learned a great  deal  about  the  menial  and  often  precarious  conditions  under  which  the women worked. As the potential benefits of organizing the informal sector workers became  clearer,  the  activists  dialogued with  the waste‐pickers  “to  figure  out with them  whether  they  saw  the  point  in  registering  a  common  organization  that further[ed] their own interests” (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009). Thus SNDT University fostered the formation of the official union, through its support of the activists who engaged the waste‐pickers via the Adult Education Program, and by providing small honorariums to those working on the project, which in 1990 was called the Project for the Empowerment of Waste‐Pickers.  The promotion of  source  segregation and doorstep collection of waste was one of the very  first activities of  the Project  for  the Empowerment of Waste‐Pickers. The initiative  was  premised  on  the  realization  by  SNDT  University’s  Adult  Education Program  employees  that  reducing  the  time  burden  of  work  for  the  waste‐picker households  was  the  surest  way  to  facilitate  school  attendance  for  their  children, who were currently picking waste. The most efficient way to reduce the time spent by  the  households  picking  waste  would  be  to  enable  them  to  collect  already segregated waste directly from the source, instead of segregating it at the municipal bins and  landfill. The Project  issued  identification cards  to 30 adult  female waste‐pickers who wished to return their daughters to school. These participants collected segregated  waste  from  sympathetic  households  in  a  nearby  upper‐class neighborhood.  The  experiment  proved  very  successful.  In  a  2004  case  study  on  KKPKP’s beginnings,  the  activists  noted  that  the women’s  “earnings  improved dramatically because source segregated scrap fetched better rates, reduced their hours of work and improved the actual physical conditions of  their work” (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 1). This success was critical to clarifying and confirming three things for the 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Project  organizers  and  participants.  First,  that  a  simple  strategy  such  as  source segregation  could  dramatically  improve  the  working  conditions  of  the  waste‐pickers.  Not only was it safer and more hygienic, it also reduced their workload and working  hours  and  granted  them  increased  income  security,  as  well  as  enabling them to spend time on other household activities. Secondly, source segregation had real  positive  economic  consequences  for  waste‐pickers  because  it  increased  the value of their product and hence their work. Third, that source segregation required community  participation  and  consumer  buy‐in,  and  this  buy‐in  was  feasible  to achieve. The  realization  that waste‐picking working conditions could be  improved and economic benefits increased was vital to further mobilization and organization of the waste‐picker community.   A second set of events moved this  initial experiment from a university‐community partnership  to  a  mass  membership‐based  organization  that  would  increasingly involve the local government and citizens as well. Six months after the segregation program began, an entrepreneur with a motorized vehicle and two workers started offering a doorstep collection service in the same neighborhood, to households who were dissatisfied with  the municipality’s waste collection. The Project participants and  leaders  saw  this event as a direct  threat  to waste‐picker  livelihoods. Through protests  and  appeals,  the waste‐pickers were  able  to  dissuade  the  residents  from purchasing the service, and the enterprise ceased (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 1). However,  the  waste‐pickers  and  activists,  with  the  guidance  of  Baba  Adhav,  the president  of  the  prominent,  local  informal  sector  labor  union  of  porters,  Hamal Panchayat,  realized  that  “small  group  endeavors  were  not  likely  to  counter  the threat” and they needed to organize on “a mass scale” (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 2). Though the threat was temporarily subverted, the organization recognized that there was  little preventing such an obstacle  from rising again, and that  the waste‐pickers could not assume eternal access to the scrap which was so crucial  to  their livelihoods. The  preoccupation  with  the  continued  right  to  waste  was  one  of  several  critical concerns  which  included  problems  of  health  and  safety,  exploitation  by  public 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sector  workers  such  as  the  police,  discrimination  from  citizens,  unfair  treatment from scrap traders, domestic violence, and the lack of a safety net in the case of old age  or  ill  health.  These  difficulties,  and  the  realization  that  private  sector  forces could threaten their incomes, set the stage for the integration of waste‐pickers into Pune’s formal solid waste management system by inspiring them to organize into a union.    In  a  sense,  it was  an  act  of  desperation  by  a  group  that  can  be  forced  no lower than it already has, but which risks being “left out” entirely if it does not step forward  to  advocate  on  its  own  behalf:  “The  formation  of  KKPKP  was  a  logical progression  in  the  process  of  organizing”  (Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  3‐4).  The move  to unionize was  informed by  the  fact  that organization on a mass‐scale had been successful  for other  informal sector groups, but also “had to do with  the  fact that legally a trade union is a ‘workers organization’ and we saw this as a first step in  establishing  waste‐pickers  as  ‘workers’”  (Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  5).  The leadership,  constituting  informal  sector  grass‐roots  activists  as  well  as  the  SNDT workers,  saw a union as an effective way  to  institute  larger systemic change, with the  added  benefit  of  the  direct  input  and  participation  of  the  waste‐pickers themselves,  culminating  in  empowerment which would  sustain  the  organization’s efforts.  Two core assumptions were essential in prompting the formation of KKPKP in 1993: one, that waste‐picking as an occupation could and should be improved (instead of eradicated),  and  two,  that  “scrap  collection  was  socially  relevant,  economically productive, and environmentally beneficial  ‘work’”(Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 3). The  benefits  reaped  by  the  30  women  who  participated  in  the  early  source segregation  and  collection  effort,  and  the  involvement  of  the  SNDT  Women’s University  volunteers  in  the  day‐to‐day  problems  of  a  frequently  ignored  group, convinced the community of waste‐pickers that collective action was a feasible and sensible course of action. The waste‐pickers themselves, resigned to an occupation that was seen as demeaning, but at times preferable to options such as construction or domestic work, were not “interested  in  income generation programs that could enable occupational  change but also entailed a  long,  slow process of  learning new 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skills  and  surviving  in  the  market.  They  were  interested  in  changing  terms  and conditions of work in their present occupation”(Chikarmane, Narayan 2004, 2). The prospect that waste‐pickers could advocate on their own behalf to attain better job security,  better  income,  and  protection  from  the  State  inspired  the  decision  to mobilize into a union and thus recast the occupation of waste‐picking itself.   In Pune, in May of 1993, “a ‘Convention of Waste‐Pickers’ was organized under Dr. Adhav’s  leadership, by the SNDT activists and Mohan Nanavre,  the son of a waste‐picker, leader of the Dalit Swayamsevak Sangh (a Dalit rights organization) and long time  associate  of  Dr.  Adhav”  (Chikarmane,  Narayan  2004,  3).  Over  800  waste‐pickers  from across Pune attended. The  resolution put  forward at  the Convention established KKPKP officially. Membership was open to anyone working as a waste‐picker who would  pay  a  nominal  annual  fee  (which  is  currently  Rupees  50).  The ideals and goals of the organization were also established at the Convention; that it would  address  both  the  pressing  needs  of  its  members,  “but  also  be  part  of  the larger  struggle  against  injustice  and  exploitation”(Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  4). The  union  adopted  methods  promoted  by  Baba  Adhav  such  as  peaceful  mass demonstrations, and though numerous social service programs would be instituted by KKPKP in the years to come, initially the organization offered nothing more than the opportunity to mobilize for a common interest. Membership grew rapidly, from 800 initially to 5000 that same year (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2000, 3641). As active membership now stands at  roughly 6000, nearly  two decades after  the union was created, it is clear that KKPKP experienced rapid growth early on. KKPKP  issued  ID  cards  to  all  union members  beginning with  the Convention,  and bearers  immediately  experienced  improved  treatment  from  police  officers,  scrap traders  and  the  public,  and  “began  to  see  themselves  as  workers,  not scavengers”(SNDT, Chintan, 2008, 46). This  formalization of waste‐pickers was an important  step  towards  the  collective  empowerment  of  these  vulnerable  women, who had never been rallied before, and were previously virtually powerless when it came  to  negotiating  rights  and  benefits.  Given  that  the work  of  the waste‐pickers resulted  in  economic  and environmental  benefits  that  accrued  to  the municipality 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through the removal of scrap, the KKPKP leadership saw the recognition of waste‐pickers  as  legitimate  workers  in  the  eyes  of  the  local  government  as  the fundamental next step.  The  achievement of municipal  endorsement of waste‐pickers  in 1996,  three years after  the  union’s  founding, was  the  result  of  continuous,  concerted  efforts  on  the part  of  the  nascent  union  to  create  a  formal  relationship  between  the  Pune Municipal  Corporation  (PMC)  and  the  organized  informal  sector  workers.  In  this relationship,  PMC,  as  the  stand‐in  for  a  direct  employer,  would  both  further  the acknowledgement  of  waste‐pickers  as  workers  and  bear  some  accountability  for their unjust conditions. The union’s core mission was to improve the conditions of waste‐pickers,  and  it  recognized  that  source  segregation  and  access  to waste was one  important  aspect;  government  participation  would  be  necessary  in  order  to achieve  this.  “The  KKPKP  spearheaded  the  struggle  for  recognition  of  scrap collectors as ‘workers’ and scrap collection as ‘work’ by the Municipalities and later the  state  government  through  a  series  of  processes.  Foremost  among  them  was organizing  and  mobilizing  scrap  collectors  through  public  rallies  and demonstrations”(Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  14).    KKPKP  also  achieved  this  by effectively eliciting the sympathy of the public and the media in their cause. In the union’s  early  years,  public  sympathy  for waste‐picker  conditions was  strong,  and the leaders saw the press and the public as an effective source of leverage to attain municipal endorsement (Narayan, Pune, July 2009). Also important was the quality of leaders in the municipal government, individuals who recognized the valuable contributions of waste‐pickers and were willing to go against  the  political  status  quo  and  consider  the  union’s  perspective.  One  of  the founders  attributed  the  success  of  KKPKP  to  the  fact  that  the  city  has  had  “a reasonably  sensitive  administration,”  (Narayan,  Pune,  July  2009),  especially  in contrast to other cities in India where officials often lack sympathy for the informal sector. More than one interviewee expressed that Pune and the state of Maharashtra boast  a history of progress  and openness  to  reform, perhaps due  to  a  tradition of activism and system change pushed by such prominent figures as Dr. Ambedkar, a 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celebrated advocate for ‘dalit’ rights (Karuna, Pune, August 2009).  The presence of reformist bureaucrats  in PMC similarly played a significant role  in the story of  the doorstep collection enterprise SWaCH—the Joint Municipal Commissioner and head of  the  Urban  Community  Development  Department  assisted  in  the  registration  of the  cooperative,  in  line  with  his  firm  belief  in  promoting  and  sub‐contracting  to organizations of the urban poor.  The union membership cards were reissued upon municipal authorization by PMC in  1996,  followed  by  the  endorsement  of  the  neighboring  Pimpri  Chinchwad Municipal Corporation (PCMC) in 1997. The new photo ID cards bore the signature of senior officials in PMC, and stated that the bearer was authorized to collect scrap in Pune. The ID cards, which had no legal basis and were for identification purposes only,  prohibited  individuals  under  the  age  of  18  years  from picking waste  (SNDT, Chintan,  2008,  47).  Following  municipal  endorsement,  the  ID  card  became  even more useful, applied “creatively, sometimes as bail when arrested on suspicion and sometimes as surety when they did not have enough capital”(Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004,  14).  For  example,  union  members  might  present  their  ID  card  to  police officers, municipal workers or citizens who challenged their right to collect scrap. As the founders noted in their case study, following municipal authorization: The  average  waste‐picker  on  the  street  is  clearly  able  to  state  her contribution to the city’s cleanliness,  to argue her claim for space to sort the scrap, to convince citizens that she is not dirty because she cleans the waste  that  they generate, and  to confront  the police saying she earns an honest livelihood (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 15).  The  formalization  of  the  ID  card  by  PMC  forged  it  into  a  symbol  not  only  of  the waste‐picker’s value as an economic actor, but her right to work. The union was able to leverage this recognition in several key ways. First, the union used  the  ID cards  to claim benefits and resources  from the State and continues  to leverage the ID cards as the government creates new schemes (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). For example, based on the endorsement of waste‐pickers as workers, 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“KKPKP  argued  for  the  inclusion  of  children  of  waste‐pickers  in  the  Central Government aided Scheme for Pre‐Matric Scholarships to Children of those engaged in  Unclean  Occupations”(Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  15).  Previously,  the  scheme had  only  applied  to  those  working  as  “night‐soil  carriers.”  The  irony  of  the government  attempting  to  bar  inclusion  by  not  recognizing  waste‐picking  as unclean was appreciated and emphasized by  the  local media, assisting  the union’s cause  by  garnering  public  support  (Chikarmane, Narayan,  2004,  15).  In  2001,  the government  of  the  state  of  Maharashtra  included  waste‐pickers’  children  in  the scheme,  accepting  the  municipal  endorsement  as  proof  of  waste‐picking  as  an unclean occupation. This benefited the waste‐pickers in Pune by making scholarship funds  available  for  their  children.  Though  various  pro‐poor  schemes  of  the government existed,  such as  ration cards  for Below Poverty Level  families, waste‐pickers  were  not  traditionally  included  in  such  schemes  because  they  lacked  the voice and resources to seek and demand benefits (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). The advent of the union and ID cards bearing the endorsement of the municipality opened up waste‐picker access to various programs.  Second,  KKPKP  applied  the  PMC  endorsement  towards  the  creation  of  new, unprecedented  programs  to  meet  the  needs  of  its  constituents.  In  one  very significant  example,  KKPKP  argued  that  given  PMC’s  acknowledgement  of  waste‐pickers as workers, and the implied responsibility of the State to protect vulnerable and marginalized citizens, PMC should contribute to  the health of union members. Similarly,  since  waste‐pickers  were  essentially  self‐employed  but  their  labor benefitted the municipality, PMC was the logical source of benefits. “In 2002‐03 the Pune  Municipal  Corporation  became  the  first  municipality  in  the  country  to institutionalize  the Scheme  for Medical  Insurance  for all Registered Waste‐pickers in  its  jurisdiction”(Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  15).  KKPKP  members  pay  the premium  to  join  the  scheme  while  the  municipality  underwrites  the  benefits.  As evinced by the distinction of  ‘registered’  in the name of the scheme, recognition of the  ID card prompted PMC to allocate and extend benefits  to a specific population that had previously been virtually  invisible. This  logistical challenge of reaching or 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measuring a targeted needy population is cited as a common motivation for public‐private coproduction of basic services (Joshi, Moore, 2004, 41). Collaboration with the  union  enabled  the  municipality  to  effectively  extend  services  to  some  of  the most impoverished individuals in the city while reserving resources that might have otherwise gone  towards outreach, documentation and evaluation  for  the  intended beneficiaries. As an embedded intermediary, KKPKP assisted the  local government in fulfilling its mandate of social inclusion at a lower cost and more effectively. This made the arrangement attractive to PMC for reasons beyond political pressure from the union.  Third, the endorsement by PMC also reinforced the rights of waste‐pickers to access and utilize  space.  In  1997, KKPKP obtained  the  “right  of waste‐pickers  to  use  by‐lanes without obstructing  traffic, as sorting sites  for scrap” (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 16). Lack of space to sort as well as store collected scrap is a great barrier to economic advancement and improved earnings for waste‐pickers, and very few had access to dedicated space for this purpose. In 1998, the Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation (PCMC), an adjoining district which has attracted numerous high‐tech firms and  thus also many waste‐pickers  (Sontakke, Pimpri Chinchwad,  July 2009), endowed KKPKP with space to operate the first waste‐picker run cooperative scrap shop  in  the  area.  This  arrangement,  ultimately  granted  by  the  Municipal Commissioner at PCMC, resulted from the persistence of the union in asserting the benefit of bypassing scrap traders.   Scrap traders were essentially middlemen who diminished the economic rewards of  the women and  frequently  took advantage of the  vulnerable  social  status  of  waste‐pickers  with  unfair  prices  and  other  tactics (Narayan,  Phone,  February  2010).  Thus  the  establishment  of  the  worker‐owned scrap  shop  was  a  logical  and  important  step  in  KKPKP’s  overarching  goal  of reducing  “points  of  exploitation”  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009)  and  extending the union’s advocacy.  
Reasons for KKPKP’s early success This overview of KKPKP’s history and its early successes suggests many themes and insights related to why KKPKP accomplished so much. 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1. Demand‐based, transparent and democratic KKPKP fulfills the expressed goals of many pro‐poor NGOs by being truly demand‐based and remaining dedicated to transparent, democratic processes that effectively engage  its  members.  Too  often  in  India,  the  lack  of  an  organized  group  or intermediary  brokering  visibly  on behalf  of  the  urban poor  translates  into  lack  of recognition  and  inclusion  of  informal  sector  groups  in  development  strategies. Various  authors  have  confirmed  that  the  presence  of  committed  and  effective intermediary  championing  for  the  rights  of  the marginalized,  or  the  ability  of  the marginalized  themselves  to  form  a  vocal  group,  is  regarded  as  important  to  that group’s successful economic and social integration and development (Sanyal, 2008, Chen et al, 2001, Harriss, 2006,  Joshi, 2009). While  the existence of an advocating NGO can greatly improve conditions for a population of the urban poor, KKPKP has demonstrated  that  the  direct  involvement  of  the waste‐pickers  themselves makes such  efforts more  productive.  This  distinction  stems  from  the  fact  that  KKPKP  is inherently demand‐based as an organization constituted of  impoverished  informal sector  workers,  not  merely  an  organization  that  attempts  to  speak  for  them.  By requiring  annual  dues  and  engaging  waste‐pickers  in  decision‐making  processes, KKPKP  ensures  that  issues  truly  important  to  its  members  inform  the  union’s initiatives.  Since its creation in 1993, KKPKP, although a union, has functioned like an NGO by providing social programs for its members and involving middle‐class activists who can more effectively dialogue with the State.  Simultaneously, its union structure has promoted buy‐in and  increased empowerment on  the part of  its members. This  is demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  the  leadership  of  KKPKP  only  pursues  programs recognized  as  important  by  its  members,  a  focus  which  helps  the  union  avoid spreading its resources too thin, and reduces incidences of programs not generating impact or being  sustained due  to  lack of political  or  financial  feasibility  (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009).  For  example,  a program  like  the waste‐picker  cooperative  scrap shop would  only  be  successful with  sufficient  interest  and  participation  from  the waste‐pickers  themselves.  It would not only be pointless  to pursue  such a project 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without  expressed  commitment  from  the members,  but would  also  be  a waste  of resources.  KKPKP members  communicate  their  needs  and  priorities  via  participation  in  the democratic processes of  the union,  such as  frequent meetings  to discuss activities under  consideration.  Additionally,  the  leaders  of  KKPKP  recognize  that  requiring annual dues, the opposite of a subsidy, is a form of buy‐in that sustains participation and ensures that  the programs are appropriate as well as provides stable revenue (Narayan,  Pune,  July  2009).  This  approach  was  premised  on  the  belief  of  its founders  that  the  union’s  system  “should  certainly  be  transparent,  it  should  be  a process that the waste‐pickers themselves are very actively involved in, it should be need‐based, depending on their needs, not our needs, not  funding determined, not activist  determined,  but  obviously waste‐picker  determined”  (Narayan,  Pune,  July 2009).  While the KKPKP leaders admit the organization does not differ from many NGOs  as  far  as  its  pursuit  of  demand‐based  and  embedded  programs  (Narayan, Pune,  July  2009),  the  fact  that  KKPKP  has  implemented  many  such  programs successfully and continuously, distinguishes  it  from similar organizations,  and can be attributed in part to its democratic, truly member‐driven structure.  That  organizing  the  urban  poor  themselves  holds  greater  potential  for  their empowerment was not only recognized by the leadership of KKPKP, but by a subset of  reformist  bureaucrats  within  the  Pune  Municipal  Corporation  who  partnered with KKPKP to develop benefits for its members and provide innovative sanitation services to the community. For example, Pune’s Joint Municipal Commissioner and head  of  the  Urban  Community  Development  Department  viewed  organizing  the residents of Pune’s slums into Neighborhood Groups and Self Help Groups as crucial in  creating  sustainable  self‐governance  and  empowerment—because  without organization,  not  only  are  the  poor  unrecognized  as  individuals  with  needs  and rights,  but  they  lack  the  inter‐relationships  that  enable  them  to  advocate  for themselves,  to  improve  their  financial  situation,  and  to  upgrade  their  livelihoods (Kalamkar,  Pune,  August  2009).  This  prominent  official’s  belief  in  the  value  of organizing  the  urban  poor  towards  greater  empowerment,  and  his  belief  that 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KKPKP was uniquely embedded in the community it served, contributed to his later promotion  of  KKPKP’s  doorstep  collection  efforts  in  the  form  of  SWaCH.  A  local environmental activist gave the informal sector advocacy group and KKPKP ally, the Self  Employed  Women’s  Association  (SEWA)  as  a  parallel  example  to  KKPKP, because  in  its  founding,  it  also  focused  on  empowerment  and mobilization  as  the first  step  to  achieving  livelihood  improvements  (Menon,  Pune,  July  2009). Empowerment  of  the  beneficiaries  themselves,  in  contrast  to  the  processes employed by many charitable groups, holds greater potential for long‐term success in poverty alleviation. One reason KKPKP’s founders were able to mobilize an effective organization of the urban poor was their creation of solidarity based on a specific trade and occupation. The Convention in 1993 brought together hundreds of waste‐pickers in the city for the first time, and impressed upon them that they have allies. One founder asserted that waste‐pickers were brought into programs more effectively not simply because the programs themselves were attractive, but because they identified strongly with the waste‐picker identity (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). Others working closely with  the  urban  poor  in  Pune  saw  the  great  heterogeneity  and  lack  of  internal connections  as  one  of  the  greatest  challenges  to  reaching  and  empowering  them (Kalamkar, Pune, August 2009, Shailabh, Pune, August 2009).  Occupational solidarity also endowed KKPKP with greater internal strength.  KKPKP leaders  cited  the  attraction of  inclusion  as  a  strong motivating  factor  for  the  very high  member  participation  in  demonstrations—even  if  members  didn’t  feel  very strongly about a particular issue, they joined in collectively agitating for it due to a conviction of the importance of advocating for the larger group (Narayan, Pune, July 2009). An  active KKPKP member  in Pimpri  Chinchwad  referenced  the democratic decision‐making process utilized within KKPKP, and described how members  saw value in supporting a particular program even if it wouldn’t benefit them personally immediately  (Sontakke,  Pimpri  Chinchwad,  August  2009).  This  collective mobilization and the fact that KKPKP frequently demonstrated its size very visibly in  the  form  of  protests  or  sit  ins  enabled  it  to  create  so much  change  in  various 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levels  of  government  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009).  Whereas  smaller organizations  of  the  urban  poor  such  as  Self  Help  Groups  can  concentrate  social capital and build community cohesion, a large union like KKPKP is more likely to get heard by the State (Menon, Pune, July 2009). In order to improve conditions for the urban  poor,  political  voice  and  recognition  is  critical.  Income  generation  at  the micro‐level might improve security for some, but large, organized groups are crucial channels  through which wider  social  change can be effected. By drawing alliances based  on  occupation,  KKPKP  succeeded  in  creating  commonality  and  community among  a  large  population  of  the  urban  poor.  This  successful  harnessing  of  the energies  of  a mass  group  has made  it more  effective  in  agitating  for  and  creating change. Its  founders see KKPKP as distinct  from other unions: “Although KKPKP is a  trade union,  and  trade  unions  are  stereotypically  looked  upon  as  ‘militant,’  ‘disruptive,’ ‘unreasonable,’  ‘violent,’  and  ‘demanding,’  the  antagonism  so  far  has  been overridden by the ‘sympathy’ factor…The waste‐pickers’ struggle for their rights is seen  as  having  a  justifiable  basis.  The  KKPKP  has  consciously  and  systematically tried  to  build  support  for  waste‐pickers  among  citizens”(Chikarmane,  Narayan, 2004, 6). Scholars confirm that informal sector unions, in contrast to formal sector unions,  “have adopted strategies  that are  less confrontational but,  in  the  long run, perhaps  more  effective  for  their  members,  who  first  and  foremost  seek acknowledgement of their contribution to the economy”(Sanyal, 2008, 154). KKPKP frequently approaches citizen groups in order to create dialogue, and is aware of the importance of public perception. Scholars have also asserted that mobilization of the marginalized  in  developing  countries  to  create  lasting  change  often  hinges  on coalitions that cross class (Goodwin, Skocpol, 1989).  KKPKP itself is an example of a successful  cross‐class  organization  that  does not  sacrifice  the  voice  and  agency of the urban poor in advocating for them; similarly, the union acknowledges the value of creating dialogue and alliances with those outside its specific membership One  way  in  which  KKPKP  has  achieved  this  is  by  specifically  avoiding  becoming “dogmatic,”  in  contrast  to  many  unions  that  overlook  or  support  the  unethical 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actions of their members for the sake of loyalty (Narayan, Pune, July 2009). This has enabled  it  to maintain  the  support  of  the  public,  the  government  and  the media.  “Unlike  conventional  trade  unions  the  KKPKP  has  also  focused  on  social development  activities  such  as  credit  provision,  education  and  child  labor  in addition to work‐related economic issues”(Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 7).  KKPKP’s involvement  in  such  interventions  portrays  it  as  more  sympathetic  to  the government and  the public. The  leaders’ willingness and  interest  in exploring and engaging  in  issues  related  to  waste‐pickers  but  not  explicitly  to  labor,  such  as environmental  issues  surrounding  solid  waste  management  practices,  or  the concerns of local citizen groups, demonstrates an ability to occupy a middle ground (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009).    In a sense, KKPKP  is a hybrid organization—a social‐minded NGO that guards itself against the rent‐seeking behavior, public distrust and antagonistic  position  of  typical  labor  unions,  but  is more  demand‐based,  focused, self‐sustaining and autonomous than a typical NGO.  2. Political independence KKPKP has explicitly and strategically  remained unaffiliated with a political party.  KKPKP’s  non‐alignment with  a  formal  political  party  has  enabled  it  to work with various groups, both within and outside of local government in negotiating gains for its constituents. According to KKPKP’s founders, unlike “a lot of mass organizations [which] are supported by political parties…we have neither been approached by a political party nor are affiliated with a political party, so we dialogue with whatever dispensation  is  in power”(Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). The  leaders of KKPKP emphasized the importance of remaining unattached to any political party from the very beginning, which increased credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and  also  made  continuous  open  dialogue  with  workers  and  officials  within  PMC possible. For example, a city councilor, and chair of the committee which sanctions municipal  tenders,  suggested  that  all  the  city’s  efforts  to  create a new solid waste management  system  would  be  for  naught  if  KKPKP  were  influenced  by  politics, implying that political interests greatly hinder productive cross‐sectoral agreements (Nikam,  Pune,  July  2009).  If  the  union  were  to  collaborate  specifically  with  one 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politician  or  recruit  the  support  of  a  certain  political  party,  its  partnerships  and agreements would also be vulnerable to changes in power. Political non‐affilitation was also intuitive, as the waste‐pickers had no pre‐existing political connections. Interviews  with  government  representatives  and  staff  from  partner  NGOs emphasized  KKPKP’s  ability  to  converse  with  multiple  actors  within  the government, which aided it in remaining dedicated to the interests of its members. The  head  of  the  Urban  Community  Development  Department  also  expressed reluctance to work with NGOs that might have political affiliations, implying that it could call his own credibility,  as well  the NGO’s motives,  into question  (Kalamkar, Pune, August 2009).  Clearly the flexibility of political non‐alignment, as well as the increase  in  trust  gained  by  demonstrating  political  autonomy,  aided  KKPKP  in forging relationships and making gains.  Related to the idea of political non‐alignment is the fact that the political terrain in Pune requires a great deal of accountability  from an organization  like KKPKP  that works  closely  with  government.  The  successful  creation  of  SWaCH  cannot  be separated  from  the  degree  of  accountability  demanded  of  it  from  other  civic organizations—‐and Pune is full of them, whether they be citizen groups advocating for their own interests, or “opportunistic groups” who didn’t like the idea of SWaCH taking over doorstep collection in Pune (Chikarmane, August 2009).  When SWaCH first emerged, a number of other organizations also suggested their own proposals, which “is bound to happen in a city where there is some amount of civic awareness” (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009).  Because of the strong civic participation in Pune, KKPKP  and  SWaCH  had  to  answer  to  numerous  community  groups  and  elected representatives  who  questioned  their  methods  (Menon,  Pune,  July  2009).  Remaining autonomous from any political party or figure better equipped KKPKP to respond to such accusations and criticisms.    In  this  sense,  the  work  of  KKPKP  represents  a  divergence  from  the  electoral accountability method,  a method  that  while  traditionally  a  channel  for  the  urban poor in India, relegates them to the identity of ‘denizen’ instead of citizen (Harriss, 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2006,  10)  and  has  proved  inadequate  as  a  social  accountability  mechanism,  or method  for  leveraging  basic  services  (Houtzager,  Joshi,  2008,  3).  Social accountability mechanisms can be more effective than the vertical electoral process or  horizontal  “institutional  checks  and  balances”  because  they  operate  outside  of politics (Joshi, 2008, 13). Ultimately,  it proved more beneficial  for KKPKP to reject this vertical electoral channel and  the associated political patronage by employing more innovative and flexible mechanisms to appeal to the State. 3. Accountability and reciprocity KKPKP lobbied PMC in such a way that exerted pressure for reform and improved government  services  while  also  fostering  a  positive  relationship.  The  leaders  of KKPKP  used  the  phrase  lobby  to  refer  to  the  broad  spectrum  of  their  advocacy activities—everything  from  mass  demonstrations,  to  meetings  with  government committees,  to  ‘exposure  visits’  or  ‘trainings’  that  involve  government  officials,  to the various studies and reports the union has published (Narayan, Phone, February 2010).  Though  some  of  the  tactics  resemble  those  of  a  ‘pressure  group,’  the interviews with  outside  observers  as well  as KKPKP  affiliates  reflected  consensus that  KKPKP  has  maintained  a  positive  relationship  with  the  Pune  Municipal Corporation, despite being at times forceful in its demands (Mhaskar, Pune, August 2009).  Other  activists  in  the  community  confirmed  that  holding  government representatives  accountable  for  promises  made  frequently  required  mass demonstrations  or  citizen  protests,  as  well  as  “finding  the  sensitive  ear”  when lobbying (Menon, Pune, July 2009). KKPKP used these types of tactics to reform PMC but was  also  accepted as  a partner or  assistant  in  this  reformation,  creating what some  scholars  refer  to  as  the  ‘institutional  fit’  between  civic  groups  and  the  State that sets the stage for ‘the politics of inclusion’ (Houtzager, 2003). For example, PMC has cited reports generated by KKPKP regarding the management of solid waste in Pune  and  the  contributions  of  the  informal  sector  in  their  publications  and presentations,  including  interviews  with  PMC  health  officials  (Wavare,  Pune,  July 2009).  Such  documentation,  which  did  not  exist  prior  to  KKPKP’s  involvement, provided PMC with a resource and set an expectation for the local government to be 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more thorough and accountable in its solid waste management practices, including monitoring  and  evaluation  (Narayan,  Phone,  February  2010).  KKPKP  provides  a unique  example  of  a  civic  organization  materially  improving  the  operations  of  a government body and assisting it in meeting the mandate of a higher authority. PMC was a logical and crucial organization for KKPKP to influence and partner with for various reasons. For one, as  the administrators of  social  services,  it was  in  the best  interest  of  municipal  officials  to  placate  the  public,  who  demonstrated dissatisfaction with the abysmal conditions so apparent among waste‐pickers, who were  in  constant  view  (Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  6).  Secondly,  PMC,  unlike  an employer when confronted by a union, had  less  reason  to  retaliate  against waste‐pickers  for mobilizing.  Scrap  traders  in  Pune,  on  the  other  hand, were  organized, and  could  limit  waste‐picker  incomes  by  setting  rates  or  refusing  to  do  business with them. Finally, solid waste in Pune becomes municipal property as soon as it is deposited  into public waste  bins,  and  thus  the  government was  an  important  ally due to its power to restrict waste‐picker access to scrap. The importance of forging a beneficial relationship with the state inspired the leaders of KKPKP to use a variety of tactics to engage PMC officials. The willingness  to  demonstrate,  and  the  ability  to  continue  to  dialogue with  PMC despite this, keeps KKPKP both autonomous and effective. Demonstrations, and the power  inherent  in  the  mass  size  of  the  waste‐picker  movement  in  Pune,  were primary tools in getting PMC on board with ID card endorsement and other benefits, and crucial  to  the union’s  success  (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). The  fact  that the endorsement of the union was not secured until 3 years following the formation of  KKPKP  illustrates  the  union’s  persistence.  However,  KKPKP  does  carefully consider  its  relationship  with  PMC  when  deciding  how  and  whether  to  publicly demonstrate, based on  the  context and  the demand  from  the membership  in each instance (Narayan, Pune, July 2009). A local activist confirmed the need at times for an  organization  such  as  KKPKP  to  exercise  influence:  “The  city…has  its  own priorities for what it would want funds for and so providing certain capacity for the informal sector may come only after putting a  lot of pressure on  the city”  (Gadgil, 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Pune,  July  2009).  The  director  of  a  local  institute  of  social  work  emphasized  the need  for  the  numerous  civic  organizations  in  Pune  to  hold  local  government accountable  by  “creating  lobbies,  and  pressurizing  local  self‐government  to  act  as per the law” (Walokar, Pune, August 2009).    It  is clear that somewhat antagonistic approaches on the part of KKPKP, employed in consideration of existing laws, were as important as diplomatic approaches in ensuring PMC fulfilled its responsibilities. Though KKPKP  took a vocal and demanding approach  in  insisting on benefits and recognition  for  waste‐pickers,  because  it  appealed  to  PMC  on  the  basis  of  social development and existing laws encouraged not only agreement, but also an amiable relationship with the State.  Demanding accountability while evoking welfare within accepted  legal  frameworks  reveals  avenues  for  the  state  to  meet  its  existing responsibilities without  questioning  its  logic  (Joshi,  2009).  The Urban Community Development Department of Pune expanded its activities in the mid‐90s as a result of decentralization  (Kalamkar, Pune, August 2009),  and PMC  thus  could  showcase the  formalization  of  waste‐pickers,  a  substantial  system  change,  as  a  logical progression  of  its  pro‐poor  activities,  rather  than  compensation  for  an  earlier shortcoming. Thus the multiple approaches of research, appeal on a social basis, and public  agitation  in  the  form  of  protests  and  sit‐ins  combined  to  assist  KKPKP  in reaching  many  of  its  milestone  achievements  regarding  the  engagement  of  the municipal government. 4. Varied linkages and relationships From  its  inception, KKPKP has  fostered  links  and partnerships with  a diversity of institutions and movements. KKPKP has many linkages with other NGOs and formal and  dominant  as  well  as  informal  sector  institutions.  As  demonstrated  earlier, KKPKP originated  from a  relationship with  SNDT Women’s University,  and  it was part  of  the  leaders’  strategy  “that  we  had  a  university  department which  offered some kind of academic name, as  it were” (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009). One  founder described  the  university’s  role  as  one  of  “promoter  of  people’s organizations”(Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009).  While  KKPKP  became  its  own 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institution  when  it  exited  the  “experimental  phase,”  by  registering  as  a  union (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009), undoubtedly  its numerous  formal  and  informal sector  linkages  enabled  it  to  scale‐up  (Sanyal,  1997).  Collaborating with  the  State enabled  KKPKP  to  increasingly  upgrade  conditions  for  waste‐pickers,  fitting  the observation  that  “NGOs  engaged  in  poverty  alleviation  should  not  be  totally disconnected from market and state institutions. Instead, they should work closely with these institutions, cleverly crafting institutional strategies that would enhance their  effectiveness  as  development  agents”  (Sanyal,  1997,  23).  While  KKPKP’s leaders  early  on  pursued  endorsement  and  a  relationship  with  PMC,  they  also recognized the value of a diversity of partnerships from the beginning, and sought to partner with grass‐roots local groups as much as elite institutions and the State. As KKPKP’s collaboration with the State grew and deepened, its ties to a much wider set of actors in civic society and grassroots social movements were key to retaining its  flexibility  while  furthering  its  reach.  Such  multiple  linkages  can  be  crucial  in maintaining an NGO’s autonomy from the State, as well as protect against  internal power  struggles  when  it  becomes  large  (Sanyal  1997).  For  example,  the  union’s engagement with Hamal Panchayat, and the frequent participation of its members in demonstrations  and  rallies  organized  by  the  radical  yet  accomplished  informal sector  union  and  other  informal  sector  organizations  (Narayan,  Pune,  July  2009), lent it credibility among the urban poor early on, and later kept it distinct from the same  municipal  government  which  had  endorsed  it.  The  leaders  of  KKPKP  also partnered  with  “a  mass‐based  ‘dalit’  group  which  was  very  much  part  of  the organization,  it still  is, so the combination of all that also worked” (Narayan, Pune, July 2009). Later, KKPKP would reinforce this autonomy from the State by creating a sister  organization,  in  the  form  of  SWaCH,  in  order  interact  with  PMC  to  fund KKPKP’s  efforts  at  a  doorstep  collection  program,  effectively  creating  a  buffer between the union and the municipality (Narayan, Phone, February 2010).  Linking up with  government,  though  crucial  to KKPKP’s  goals, would have  endangered  its autonomy  and  inhibited  other  important  relationships  in  the  absence  of  these varied ties. 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Relationships  with  large  research  and  governance  institutions,  such  as  the International  Labor  Organization  (ILO),  the  German  federal  development organization  GTZ,  and  the  All  India  Institute  of  Local  Self  Government  (AIILSG), were  forged  and  encouraged  in  recognition  that  endorsement  by  such  entities would  greatly  support  KKPKP’s  work.  KKPKP  chose  to  work  with  these organizations  through  research,  carrying  out  studies  sponsored  by  them  that illuminated  waste  management  issues  and  the  reality  and  role  of  the  informal sector.  Specifically,  the  founders  recognized  that  their  arguments  regarding  the contributions  and  working  conditions  of  waste‐pickers  would  not  be  considered legitimate unless  endorsed by  large, well‐known  institutions. Without  this  type of public acceptance by an organization like the ILO or GTZ, readers would likely not “trust  the methodology or  the  figures” and studies  commissioned by a  “big name” carried more weight (Narayan, Phone, February 2010). In the case of the 2001 ILO‐commissioned public study on waste‐picker livelihoods, the ILO approached KKPKP because  the  union was  one  of  the  few  organizations working  closely with waste‐pickers  at  the  time  (Narayan,  Phone,  February  2010).  The  GTZ  study,  which occurred  “across  6  cities  in  different  continents,”  incorporated  KKPKP’s  input thanks  to  an  encounter  at  a  conference  with  an  advocacy  group  based  in  the Netherlands,  WASTE  (Narayan,  Phone,  February  2010).  For  the  AIILSG  study documenting  solid  waste  management  in  Pune,  KKPKP  proactively  sought  the “stamp of authority” from this entity (Narayan, Phone, February 2010). These types of endorsements enabled KKPKP to use the reports to further the union’s goals and recommendations, lending the union greater influence and acceptance in the public sphere while  allowing  the  staff  to  collect  and analyze data according  to  their own methods. Additionally,  KKPKP’s  ongoing  goal  of  upgrading  occupational  and  livelihood conditions  for  its  membership  required  a  broader  view  supported  by  active research.  “We had to finally move beyond just worker needs and look at the larger framework in which those workers worked and the changes that were taking place in  that  area,  because  otherwise  we  would  have  become  redundant  very  soon” 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(Chikarmane,  Pune, August 2009). The KKPKP  leadership noted  that  the  sector  of solid waste management  in particular has undergone significant  “rapid change”  in the last decade—some of which the union encouraged and some of which originated elsewhere  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009).  The  pursuit  of  research  by KKPKP’s leaders was not only to establish credibility, but also to better understand the sector themselves.  Ultimately,  KKPKP  succeeded  in  remaining  pertinent  and  effective,  as their research bolstered their ability to integrate their members into formal sector solid waste management.  No  less  important  were  the  alliances  KKPKP  spearheaded  with  local  as  well  as national and international NGOs. The leaders of KKPKP formed WasteMatters to link up with  environment‐concerned NGOs within  Pune.  This  partnership  enabled  the groups  to  argue  more  forcefully  for  ecologically  superior  management  by  local government.  Though  KKPKP’s  interests  are  not  exactly  aligned  with  other  such NGOs in Pune, its leaders recognized that the goals of increased scrap recovery and recycling support environmental concerns, and could be leveraged towards greater advocacy and  influence  (Gadgil, Pune,  July 2009). One of  the  initial participants  in the alliance described the formation of WasteMatters, which became very active in informing government policy in 2006, as initiated by KKPKP in order to “expand and partner with  other  organizations  in Pune,  primarily  because  they were  looking  at graduating  from  being  the  trade  union…starting  to  integrate  with  waste‐pickers much more widely  into  doorstep  collection,  and  the  thought  that  having  a  broad‐based partnership of NGOs would help in doing that” (Menon, Pune, July 2009). The union’s  leaders  see engaging with  the  larger  environmental movement as  another way  to  remain  aware  of  new  solid  waste  management  developments  as  well  as advocate  for  improved  conditions  for  waste‐pickers  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August 2009).  Just  as  organizing  waste‐pickers  was  a  logical  extension  of  advocacy, recognizing  and  emphasizing  the  environmental  value  of  their  work  is  a  logical extension of KKPKP’s relationship‐building and expertise.  Ultimately,  the  alliance  of WasteMatters  assisted  KKPKP’s  goal  to  achieve  source segregation  and  doorstep  collection  towards  improving  livelihoods  for  waste‐
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pickers.  WasteMatters  prompted  the  Municipal  Commissioner  to  set  up  “a  core committee to look at policy‐level issues of waste management,” in which the alliance pushed  for waste‐picker  inclusion  in  the  doorstep  collection  of waste,  influencing the City Development Plan to recommend informal sector integration (Menon, Pune, July  2009).  Though  the  CDP  is  not  a  binding  document,  this  achievement demonstrated the perceived  importance of maintaining channels of  influence:  “We shouldn’t have to wait until the draft plan is published to get our comments in…but have  our  inputs  into…the  creation  of  the  draft  development  plan  itself”  (Menon, Pune,  July 2009). This mirrors a strategy of KKPKP—the idea of striking while the iron is hot, when the window of opportunity opens, before possibly harmful policies become  institutionalized.  The  NGOs  also  hold  PMC  accountable  to  the environmental mandates of the state law, including providing space for sorting and storing  scrap.  Thus  the  creation  of  WasteMatters,  to  harness  the  discontent  of various  activists  regarding  Pune’s  unsustainable  and  inefficient  solid  waste management  practices  and  lack  of  environmental  quality,  was  a  savvy  and productive move  by  KKPKP’s  leadership  to  inform  their  own  initiatives, maintain influence on government, and promote waste‐picker livelihoods. It is key that KKPKP is seen as working towards creating agreement, and educating and  engaging  numerous  groups  to  achieve  common  understanding  and  common goals.  The  director  of  a  local  school  of  social  work  cited  KKPKP  as  effective  in building  waste‐picker  awareness  and  capacity,  and  also  creating  “consensus” (Walokar, Pune,  July 2009).  In reaching out to other NGOs and community groups, KKPKP reveals the value and overlap of its work. Even though it is dedicated to the interests of its specific members, the union demonstrates core beliefs that resonate with other groups. KKPKP also prompted the formation of  the National Alliance of Waste‐Pickers  in  2005,  understanding  the  value  of  shared  knowledge,  including technical  assistance which  KKPKP,  a  seasoned  organization,  could  offer  the  other waste‐picker NGOs and unions in India.  KKPKP has been  involved with WIEGO as well as other  international waste‐picker advocacy  groups,  and  attended  the  2010  Copenhagen  talks  to  advocate  for 
 34 
preserving  the  livelihoods  of  the  informal  sector  recyclers  around  the world,  and draw  attention  to  the  superiority  of  recycling  in  contrast  to  other  waste management  methods.  A  member  of  WasteMatters  attributed  the  success  of  the union to the wide range of activities  it undertakes: “They are doing the grassroots work,  the mobilization and empowerment of  the most dis‐privileged people  in  the city,  to  actually doing  the policy work at  the  city,  state, national  and  international level…They  undertake  research  and  studies,  so  it’s  rigorous  work  that  they  do, and…they’re bang  in  the  center of what  sustainable development means”  (Menon, Pune, July 2009).  As will be discussed in the next chapter, networking proved to be crucial  to  KKPKP’s  success  in  shaping  and  informing  the  Municipal  Solid  Waste Rules  of  2000  to  create  a  space  for  the  integration  of waste‐pickers  via  doorstep collection;  because  of  its  prominent work,  the  union was  tapped  to  provide  input during  the  drafting  and  were  able  to  encourage  language  that  recommended recycling,  source  segregation,  and  the  inclusion  of  waste‐pickers.  By  forming relationships  that  related  to  waste‐picker  rights,  but  also  engaging  a  variety  of stakeholders  such  as  citizens,  environmental  activists  and  international development  organizations,  KKPKP  remained  aware  of  emerging  issues,  potential challenges and new opportunities to further its cause.  5. Pune’s context It is difficult to ignore the context of Pune; from its citizenry to its government, and which social, cultural and demographic features may have assisted in the success of KKPKP  and  its  programs.  KKPKP’s  leaders  acknowledged  that  Pune’s  size  was particularly “manageable” (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009). Staff of CHF International, a global  humanitarian  aid  organization,  undertaking  projects  organizing  and integrating  waste‐pickers  in  other  cities  confirmed  that,  unlike  in  Bangalore  or Nagpur,  the  city  is  not  so  big  or  spread  out  to  thwart  uniting  the  waste‐picker community, yet there is enough mass to mobilize into a loud and recognizable voice (Buddhe, Phone, August 2009, Chengappa, Phone,  July 2009). KKPKP’s  co‐founder did refute the idea that simply having a union, regardless of its size, would make a difference. The waste‐pickers in Pune “have been recognized as a constituency, as a 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force,”  in  part  because  “the  decision‐makers  understand  the  value  of  numbers” (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009).  The  success  of  the  union  and  its  programs  in Pune  are  thus directly  linked  to  the  substantial  number of waste‐pickers working there, as well as possibly the circular, centralized geography of the city. According  to  its  founders,  the  nature  of  the  city  of  Pune,  its  administration  and demographics, contributed to the success of KKPKP more than timing or the greater political climate (Narayan, Pune, July 2009). The union has undeniably worked hard to be acknowledged and “visible, and therefore articulating on behalf of itself that it needs  certain  conditions,” but whereas many cities  in  India have a  long history of corrupt  or  obstinate  government  officials,  “Pune  has  not  had  a  string  of  such people…We’ve had…a reasonably good,  let’s say, sympathy value for waste‐pickers who were perceived as a really poor, marginalized group which had been hitherto neglected, so we got some level of mass external support…a kind of moral support.  So  those  factors  do  make  a  difference”  (Narayan,  Pune,  July  2009).  The predominance of government administrators who appear insensitive to the needs of the informal sector is noted in the literature as well (Sanyal, 2008). Likewise, many describe the public in Pune as highly educated, progressive and socially aware, and that  the  city  as well  as  the  state  of Maharashtra  has  a  history  and  reputation  for activism and civic engagement (Sreenivas, Pune, August 2009). The large number of NGOs in Pune, at least 200 of which are “very professional” (Walokar, Pune, August 2009), as well as the presence of a sympathetic media (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009), also  relates  to  this.  While  many  interviewees  observed  that  the  municipal corporation  in  Pune  is  widely  considered  superior  to  most  in  India,  and  is exceptional  in  encouraging  civic  engagement  (Jagtap,  Pune,  July  2009), representatives of KKPKP believed that “it is the activist activity in Pune that keeps the PMC on its toes, so to speak” (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). The municipal corporation  is  perceived  as not  only more  efficient  and effective  than  comparable administrations,  but  as  open‐minded,  even  “pioneering”  when  it  comes  to  social programs  —  especially  the  Urban  Community  Development  Department,  which came to play a prominent role  in  the  integration of waste‐
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fact  that  Pune’s  elected  officials  have  been  consistently  progressive  created  an atmosphere  where  KKPKP  could  successfully  go  forward,  and  the  presence  of  a liberal and sympathetic citizenry also enabled the union’s success. KKPKP seemed to both foster, and was fostered by, a progressive activist attitude prevalent in Pune.   6. Quality of leadership A  final  reason  for  KKPKP’s  success  that  is  clearly  related  to  the  previous explanations, but bears additional attention, is the focus, dedication and foresight of KKPKP’s leadership. One founder stated that an important factor towards KKPKP’s success  and  longevity  were  the  “people  who  started  it,”  including  Baba  Adhav, Mohan Nanavre and SNDT University, “who kept their focus on the cause,” and did not engage in power struggles (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). Another NGO head described how the unique and distinct “orientations” of each leader contributed to KKPKP’s achievements: “It is both the strengths of academic rigor and ground‐level rigor  that  is  really embodied  in Poornima and Lakshmi,  that’s  this axis of KKPKP” (Menon, Pune, July 2009). The singular commitment to the cause, and the lack of ego or vested interests kept KKPKP on a sustainable and effective trajectory.   Also key  is  that  two middle‐class women  from educated backgrounds  successfully embedded  themselves  with  the  waste‐pickers  in  Pune,  gaining  a  deeper understanding of the challenges they faced.  Thus KKPKP seems to rebel against the categories  for  Indian civil society organizations posed by Harriss,  in being a union that  was  mobilized  by  middle‐class  activists  but  does  not  perpetuate  the subordination of its poorer beneficiaries by being ‘for the people’, rather than ‘of the people’ (Harriss 2006). Such embeddedness and a history with the community aids program  success,  and  highlights  a  challenge  for  organizations  trying  to  address issues in a particular community for the first time. “A baseline survey would indicate certain  things,  but  if  you  have  no  relationship with  the  community,  you  don’t  get very good data” (Narayan, Pune, July 2009).  A PMC official, in noting his willingness to  work  with  KKPKP  when  he  was  typically  averse  to  working  with  most  NGOs, touched on the importance of both leadership quality and embeddedness when he 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stated that “definitely they are different, they are very sincere, they have access to grass‐roots level, whatever they say, they do it, there is a commitment” (Kalamkar, Pune, August 2009). This statement highlights not only that KKPKP is perceived by many to be truly demand‐based and engaged with the community of urban poor, but also that its staff maintain a sincerity and follow‐through perhaps not demonstrated by all NGOs, however well‐intentioned. One  way  in  which  the  activists  secured  the  trust  of  the  waste‐pickers  was  by demonstrating  their  recognition  that  upgrading  waste‐picker  occupations  was  a preferable recourse  to attempting  to move the women  into occupations outside of working  with  scrap.  “This  understanding  translated  into  KKPKP’s  perspective  on scrap collection and the organizational strategies that derived from it” (Chikarmane, Narayan,  2004,  2).  To  assume  that  some occupation,  that might pay  slightly more than waste‐picking,  is worth  the  long hours of  training and skill development and time  spent  away  from  income  generation,  simply  because  it  might  be  within  the formal  sector  or  outside  of  waste,  “that  itself  is  a  very,  very  fallacious  kind  of presumption to make, so we would never make it”(Narayan, Pune, July 2009). Such a  shared  perspective  created  the  demand  necessary  to  effectively  mobilize  and participate in the union.   The  efforts  of  the  leaders  to  remain  cognizant  of  emerging  issues  and  foresee potential  future  threats  aided  in  the  union’s  success  and  sustainability.  KKPKP began  working  well  in  advance  of  many  of  the  current  challenges,  before  waste management  in  Pune  had  reached  the  level  of  crisis  that  seemed  to  require privatization of municipal services. Because its  leaders recognized the  inevitability of  such  issues,  KKPKP  was  able  to  identify  proper  tactics,  position  itself  as  an articulate, informed and effective advocate for a vulnerable population and address these threats before they were irreversible.  As early as the year 2000, the founders cited  the  impending arguments over  the rights of various  individuals or groups  to access valuable scrap, and the social as well as environmental problems in adopting expensive solid waste management technologies just beginning to be hawked by the private sector (Chikarmane, Narayan 2000, 3642). “When we started this doorstep 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Accountable, Affordable and Equitable Waste Management Solution The Solid Waste Collection and Handling Cooperative, or SWaCH,  is an  innovative, poor‐inclusive approach to improved solid waste management in the city of Pune. In 2007,  a  contract  between  PMC  and  KKPKP  for  the  delivery  of  doorstep  waste collection  services  created  SWaCH  as  a  separate  membership‐based  enterprise. Operational as of 2008, SWaCH is responsible for implementing the doorstep waste collection  initiative.  The  contract  between  PMC  and  KKPKP  stipulates  that  in addition  to  the necessary  infrastructure,  such as  carts,  gloves and boots, PMC will dedicate  funding  of  roughly  one  crore,  or  ten  million,  Rupees  each  year  for  five years, that is, until 2012, after which SWaCH is expected to become financially self‐sustaining.  The  governing  board  of  the  service  provider  is made  up  of  14 waste‐pickers,  two  representatives  from  Pune  Municipal  Corporation  and  one representative of KKPKP. Its management team, whose salaries are covered by PMC, includes a CEO and staff in operations and training. Currently, SWaCH employs over 1600 women  as  doorstep  collectors,  largely  but  not  exclusively  KKPKP members, serving roughly 200,000 households  (Jog, Pune, August 2009). SWaCH operates  in all  14  wards  of  Pune,  and  as  of  2008,  in  127  of  the  144  quortis,  or  electoral subdivisions within the wards (SNDT, Chintan, 2008, 52). SWaCH is structured as a cooperative, in the interest of sustainability and member buy‐in, in the same mode of  KKPKP’s  other  revenue‐generating  ventures,  such  as  the  scrap  shop  and  credit society.   Doorstep  collectors work  in pairs  serving  roughly 100 households,  traveling  from door  to door daily  to  collect  the  segregated waste. On a monthly basis  the pair of collectors take a fee of 10 Rupees from each household or establishment, splitting it between them. The Pune Municipal Corporation agreed to cover half of the monthly fee  for  households  in  informal  settlements  though  SWaCH  staff  report  this obligation  has  not  been  fulfilled  (Jog,  Pune,  August  2009).  In  their  role  in  the doorstep collection system, households and commercial units are expected to keep 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their organic waste, also referred to as wet waste, in a separate bag or bucket from their dry or inorganic waste, and hand both over to doorstep collectors. Though the law  mandates  source  segregation  and  doorstep  collection  of  solid  waste,  citizen participation  is  effectively  voluntary,  as  many  PMC  officials  avoid  penalizing properties that refuse to either segregate waste or pay the monthly fee. As doorstep collectors have little incentive to collect waste from households who refuse to pay, this  results  in  spotty  participation;  as  of  August  2009,  of  the  127  quortis  SWaCH operates in, 10 enjoyed nearly 100% service coverage (Jog, Pune, August 2009). It is not  uncommon  for  doorstep  collectors  to  segregate  the  waste  themselves  upon receiving it from the waste generator. Virtually all dry waste collected is recyclable and  the  collectors  are  free  to  sell  the  scrap  and  retain  the  profits.  Though  the ultimate goal of PMC is for all waste generators to dispose of their own wet waste on site, via vermiculture, composting or biogas, not all sites have this capacity yet, and again, municipal enforcement  is weak. Thus,  in many cases,  the collectors  transfer the wet waste to municipal trucks at designated collection points.  SWaCH  has  various  additional  staff  members  who  coordinate  and  monitor  the doorstep  collectors  to  ensure  proper  support  as well  as  fulfillment  of  duties.  The SWaCH administration assigns each of  the 14 municipal wards a  field coordinator, who works closely with the ward office in that area, for example, synchronizing the “feeder  point  system” which  enables  the  collectors  to  deposit wet waste with  the municipality,  and  also  looks  after  roughly  10  supervisors  working  at  the  quorti‐level. The supervisors in turn monitor 25 to 30 women who collect waste door‐to‐door in each quorti, keeping track of absenteeism or interpersonal conflicts such as complaints  from  citizens,  or whether  the workers  have  adequate  equipment  (Jog, Pune, August 2009). The SWaCH administrators and  the Solid Waste Management Department of the Pune Municipal Corporation convene every two weeks to discuss issues and needs, and communicate in the interim as needed. To ensure the future sustainability  of  the  cooperative,  doorstep  collectors  who  earn  more  than  1000 Rupees  a  month  are  asked  to  contribute  5  percent  of  their  earnings  back  to  the 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organization. They do not contribute any of  the profits  they make  from selling the dry recyclable scrap they collect. SWaCH was  born  in  the  new  political  space  created  by  the  central  government’s issuance of the MSW 2000 Rules. The Rules were drafted by a Committee on Solid Waste  Management  set  up  by  the  Honorable  Supreme  Court  of  India  in  1998,  in response  to  a  petition  filed  by  Almitra  Patel,  among  others.  Published  by  the Ministry  of  Environment  and  Forests,  the  Rules  set  new  standards  for  municipal solid waste management, such as a doorstep collection system, separate systems for certain generators such as hospitals and hotels, the promotion of source segregation to ensure the recycling of scrap, and the processing of organic garbage “using least‐polluting biological methods”  (Chikarmane, Narayan 2006,  5). KKPKP had  already quasi‐formalized  its  members  and  achieved  protections  and  benefits  in  1996 through the municipality’s recognition of  the union ID cards, but  the union sought further  achievement  of  source  segregation  and  ensured  continued  waste‐picker access  to  waste.  From  the  perspective  of  PMC,  the  contractual  agreement  with KKPKP  and  promotion  of  source  segregation  provided  a  solution  to  the  new guidelines, which they were required to institute by 2003, and the impending solid waste  disposal  crisis.  Importantly,  the  agreement  allowed  PMC  to  circumvent  the controversial  push  towards  privatization  and  improve  its  performance  in  solid waste  collection  and  disposal  in  collaboration  with  an  organization  that  already enjoyed recognition and support amongst both municipal officials and the public. However,  the  funding  of  SWaCH  by  was  not  without  opposition,  from  other community  groups  as  well  as  PMC  officials.  The  proposal  to  give  the  work  of doorstep  collection  to  a  cooperative  of  waste‐pickers  roused  various  civic organizations, which formed committees to lobby their elected representatives not to support the initiative (SNDT, Chintan, 2008, 32). Though the financial support to SWaCH was approved by the Standing Committee and the General Body of PMC in February 2007, the turnover in the members of the General Body following elections resulted in “a few detractors in the new body which rescinded the approach granted by  the  General  Body  after  the  cooperative was  registered”  (SNDT,  Chintan,  2008, 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52). However, the new Municipal Commissioner was also supportive of SWaCH, and successfully  appealed  to  the  state  government  to  “overrule  the  municipal  body’s resolution  to  rescind”  (SNDT,  Chintan,  2008,  52).  Though  the  creation  of  SWaCH required much advocacy and struggle on the part of KKPKP, it confirmed the strong relationships the union had with various  levels of government that recognized the social  contributions  of  the  union  as  well  as  the  economic  contributions  of  its member‐workers. The  integration  of  SWaCH within  the municipality’s  solid waste  collection  system came with many caveats, which may have ultimately benefitted KKPKP by allowing it  to maintain autonomy  from PMC, as well  as assisted  its ability  to  self‐scrutinize and thus innovate and improve. For example, three other organizations of the urban poor  in Pune who were undertaking waste management  activities became part  of SWaCH as part of the renegotiations with PMC (SNDT, Chintan, 2008, 36). A second agreement required that SWaCH collectors would not demand employment directly from PMC, but rather would be paid from the fee of 10 Rupees per household that they  collected  themselves.  By  the  time  the  contract  formalized  SWaCH,  there was already a 10 year history of benefits, such as medical insurance, provided to waste‐pickers  thanks  to  the  collaboration  of  the municipal  government;  this  stipulation protected PMC against providing additional benefits above and beyond the existing schemes. Thirdly, PMC also required SWaCH to open doorstep collector positions to any  member  of  the  urban  poor,  regardless  of  whether  they  were  previously  a member  of  KKPKP  or  even  a waste‐picker  (SNDT,  Chintan,  2008,  52).  Finally,  the five‐year  sunset  agreement  after  which  SWaCH  would  not  receive  any  direct financial  assistance  from PMC protected PMC against  ongoing  responsibility  if  the doorstep collection enterprise was not successful. Given the context of KKPKP’s foundational work as well as the unique political and logistical  challenges  faced by  the  emerging  enterprise,  I will  now explore  in more detail  how  this  context  translated  into  the  adoption  of  SWaCH’s  solid  waste management model. 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1. Informing solid waste management standards KKPKP  influenced  the  creation  of  the  very  rules  that mandated  these  changes — that  is,  source  segregation  of  waste,  doorstep  collection  and  disposal  of  organic waste  on  site. The  endorsement  by  PMC  of  KKPKP  and  the  union’s  achievements that  followed  enabled  further waste‐picker  acknowledgement  and  integration,  on government  levels  above  the  municipal,  thus  establishing  a  channel  of  influence from the bottom up as well as a mechanism for further improvement in Pune. The union exercised this influence by informing the drafting of the MSW 2000 Rules. The Committee on Solid Waste Management requested input of KKPKP and other waste‐picker advocacy groups in India in drafting its recommendations. In 1998, KKPKP as well as SEWA and Stree Mukti Sanghatna sent recommendations requested by  the Committee, emphasizing not only the preservation of waste‐picker  livelihoods, but also their very integration into the solid waste management processes. Additionally, the Committee deployed a representative to Pune to gather more information from KKPKP  on  how  to  successfully  integrate  the  informal  sector  in  solid  waste management (SNDT, Chintan, 2008, 29). Consequently, the Rules, which “direct the municipalities in 41 Class I municipalities to extend their mandatory responsibility (collection  from common points) and undertake measures  for door‐step collection of  waste  and  citizens  education  for  source  segregation,”  (Chikarmane,  Narayan, 2004, 16) also  recommend  the  integration of waste‐pickers,  though  that  aspect of the  rules  is  discretionary  (SNDT, Chintan,  2008, Annexure  III).  This  influence was not completely unprecedented, as  the endorsement of union  ID cards by PMC and PCMC  in  1996  and  1997  had  “since  been  followed  by  a  notification  from  the Maharashtra  State  government  directing  municipalities  to  register  waste‐pickers and  issue  identity  cards  and pursue methods of  integrating  them  into  solid waste collection  through  their  organizations  or  through  NGOs”  (Chikarmane,  Narayan, 2004,  14).    The  Government  of  Maharashtra  issued  these  directives  in  1999  and 2002 respectively, and KKPKP credits the interest in waste‐picker integration to the “presence  of mass  organizations  of waste‐pickers  in  Pune  and Mumbai  and  other cities”  (SNDT,  Chintan,  2008,  16).    KKPKP  was  clearly  successful  in  not  only 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influencing government norms as they related to waste‐pickers, but also using the recent legislation to the union’s advantage.  2. Foresight and prior understanding KKPKP  was  poised  to  take  advantage  of  a  situation  in  which  PMC  considered privatizing doorstep collection of waste because  it had  foreseen  this problem, and recognized  the  value  of  source  segregated  waste  in  improving  the  conditions  for waste‐pickers.  The  union  leadership  was  likewise  cognizant  of  the  threat  to continued waste‐picker access  to waste  if PMC contracted out or privatized waste collection. Because KKPKP created a relationship with PMC in 1996 that established the  waste‐picking  occupation  as  valuable  in  economic  and  ecological  as  well  as social  terms,  the union could  then effectively argue  for a  solid waste management solution  that  incorporated  waste‐pickers  and  further  improved  their  conditions. KKPKP  also  recognized  that  allowing  consumers  to  deposit  un‐segregated  waste into bins  in public  locations created a scenario  in which the waste‐picker not only had to dig through dangerous and unclean materials, but potentially competed with those  who  were  not  waste‐pickers,  but  recognized  the  value  of  scrap,  such  as conservancy  workers,  security  guards  and  domestic  help  (Chikarmane,  Narayan 2000, 3641). The establishment of the MSW 2000 Rules by the central government created  an  opportunity  to  further  push  for  continued  access  to  waste  and  fill  a service  gap  that  would  improve  as  well  as  ensure  continued  waste‐picker livelihoods.   Some  municipalities  chose  to  meet  the  national  mandate  by  contracting  out doorstep  garbage  collection,  and  the  KKPKP  founders  observed  that  this  option displaced waste‐pickers in places such as Nasik, Maharashtra (Chikarmane, Narayan 2006,  16),  just  as  the  contracting  of  entrepreneurs  for  doorstep  collection  by dissatisfied  citizens  in  Pune  had  displaced  future  KKPKP  members  (Chikarmane, Narayan 2000, 3640).  The anticipation of such a probable outcome inspired KKPKP to step in and provide an alternative for PMC before it moved to officially privatize the mandatory doorstep collection in Pune.  “An important outcome of Almitra Patel 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vs. The Union of India was that by December 2003 the Supreme Court expected that a  system  of  door‐to‐door  collection  of  segregated  waste,  composting  of  organic waste,  and  recycling  of  recyclable wastes was  to  be  in  place  in  all municipalities.  This created an unprecedented opportunity for waste pickers with some degree of organization  to  directly  access  household  garbage”  (SNDT,  Chintan,  2008,  29). Integration of the informal sector into doorstep collection was desirable because the gleaning  of  recyclable  scrap  would  be  more  efficient  if  waste‐pickers  gathered directly from households, and waste‐pickers would become an essential street‐level worker.  Their  face‐to‐face  interactions with  households  on  a  daily  basis, with  the expectation that households would personally segregate dry and wet waste, ensured a higher  level of accountability on  the part of  the waste generator  in contrast  to a more  impersonal  system,  employing  salaried  workers  who  have  no  incentive  to guarantee  segregation.  Because  the  dry  waste  would  be  recycled  by  the  waste‐picker and (eventually) the wet waste would be disposed of on the residential site, per the MSW 2000 Rules, virtually zero waste would go to the landfill. Before these Rules  were  actively  implemented  in  2003,  waste‐pickers  made  a  living  from undertaking waste segregation—but  they were never paid  for  the  labor,  they only earned  income  from  the  scrap  they  filtered  out  and  sold.  Thus  promoting  source segregation did not detract from the occupation of the waste‐picker by taking away paid labor she had previously performed, but rather had the effect of making her job more  efficient  and  thus more  profitable  (Chikarmane,  Narayan  2004,  13).  KKPKP was already organized, fast growing, and connected with the waste‐pickers as well the municipality and  larger community, and had articulated the value of enhanced waste‐picker  access  to  segregated  waste  through  its  research  and  prior  pilot projects.  3. Demonstrated capacity While KKPKP had clearly established itself as an expert on solid waste management, it was also able to demonstrate its ability to start a cooperative enterprise in solid waste management,  due  to  a 2005 doorstep  collection pilot which was  conducted with  the political  support of PMC and  the  cooperation of  its ward officers. KKPKP 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pursued  a  number  of  doorstep  collection  initiatives  from  the  beginning,  but  the “Harbingers  of  Cleanliness”  pilot which  served  homes  in  all  14 wards  of  the  city, with  cooperation  and  discretionary  funds  from  specific  ward  councilors,  was probably  the  most  formal  prior  to  SWaCH’s  establishment  in  2007.  KKPKP’s leadership  confirmed  that  the pilot  arose  from a perceived opportunity  related  to the government’s MSW 2000 Rules about segregated waste collection. Based on the MSW  2000  Rules,  “In  February  2005,  the  Pune  Municipal  Corporation  adopted  a stand that  it will collect only segregated wet waste into its stream…This was in an effort to promote and enforce segregation and encourage the integration of waste‐pickers  for  the  door  to  door  collection  of  dry,  recyclable  waste”  (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2006, 48). KKPKP drew on its record of facilitating source segregation and doorstep  collection  in  a  number  of  neighborhoods  to  initiate  the  pilot  and demonstrate these benefits to the municipality (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 16‐17). “By  the  end  of  2006  almost  1200  waste‐pickers  were  integrated  as  service providers,  covering  over  150,000  households  and  recovering  user  fees,”  in  Pune (SNDT, Chintan,  2008,  50).    A portion of  expenses was  covered by  a  local  agency, while  PMC  provided  the  cycles;  KKPKP  pressed  PMC  to  support  the  pilot  on principle,  because  PMC  benefitted,  and  support  represented  a  stronger endorsement of the work of the union (Narayan, Phone, February 2010).  KKPKP did not  contract  the  service,  but  simply  promoted  it,  with  PMC’s  permission  and  the cooperation  of  local  representatives  at  the  ward  level.  The  waste  generators, residential  as  well  as  commercial,  contracted  with  waste‐pickers  directly  via  a monthly service fee.  The pilot positioned KKPKP to argue effectively for the merit of further investment from PMC in order to expand and revamp this operation. KKPKP had  shown  that  it  could  take  resources  provided  by  government  and  use  them effectively,  not  only  in  the  pilot,  but  also  in  other  KKPKP  programs,  such  as  the health insurance scheme and scrap shop. KKPKP  staff  outlined  two  key  lessons  of  the  pilot:  “One,  that  waste‐pickers  can change their way of collection to provide regular daily…waste collection services…It is  possible  for  them  to  change  their  pattern  of work.  Second, was  that  citizens,  if 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provided  a  good  service,  are willing  to  pay  for  the most  part”(Chikarmane,  Pune, August  2009).  While  KKPKP’s  leaders  observed  in  1990  that  waste‐picker livelihoods  and  work  conditions  could  be  improved  by  door‐step  collection  of segregated waste,  the 2005 pilot  further proved  that  a  fee‐based  system could be successful.  The  two  achievements,  changing  waste‐picker  habits  and  achieving voluntary participation from waste generators, are also linked; improvement in the services  and  reliability  of  the  doorstep  collector will  encourage  participation  and buy‐in by the waste‐generator, and vice versa. The pilot may not have achieved such successful  integration  if not  for  the  institution of  the MSW 2000 Rules, but clearly KKPKP’s past experience and strategy played a large role.  4. Informal sector integration as solid waste management reform Additionally, KKPKP  successfully  presented  the  formal  integration  of  local  waste‐pickers  as  a  compelling  reform  of  the  city’s  solid waste management  system  that would reduce the municipality’s burden in terms of the transportation and disposal of waste. Thanks to its past achievements and status as one of a few organizations in India working directly with the informal recycling sector, KKPKP was accepted as an expert on informal solid waste management systems and a useful sanitation service intermediary.  Supported  by  studies  conducted  with  the  involvement  of  credible institutions,  such  as  the  ILO  and  SNDT Women’s  University,  KKPKP  convincingly demonstrated  that  integration  into  the  formal  system  would  not  only  improve conditions  for  waste‐pickers  and  reduce  costs  for  the  city,  but  that  the  current system was unsustainable and inefficient. A  2006  assessment  of  Pune’s  solid  waste  generation  and  options  for  processing, conducted  by  KKPKP  and  commissioned  by  the  All  India  Institute  of  Local  Self Government  (AIILSG),  exemplifies  how  the  union’s  research  effectively  promoted SWaCH and reformed PMC’s existing waste management. While AIILSG specified the formats  for  primary  data  collection,  the  approach  and  drafting  of  the  final  report was in the hands of KKPKP’s leaders (Narayan, Phone, February 2010). The report informed PMC regarding the quantity, content, calorific value and density of waste 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generated in Pune’s different wards, as well as the capacity for adequate and cost‐effective  collection  and  transport.  It  set  a  precedent  in  data  collection  and documentation  regarding  waste  management  in  the  city,  and  made  innovative recommendations  towards  improving  the  system  and  integrating  the  informal sector.   The study emphasized that a more personal, primary mode of collection would be more efficient, and successful at keeping waste segregated, than the current system. PMC fulfilled the bulk of its required door‐to‐door collection of waste with ghanta‐trucks (bell‐trucks), which stopped in the street outside properties and rang a bell to notify residents to bring out their garbage. The report noted “the abysmally low collection of garbage by the ghanta‐trucks in some wards makes it a very expensive method  of  door‐to‐door  collection  for  PMC”  (Chikarmane,  Narayan  2006,  47).  In some wards,  the cost  to PMC was as much as 5 Rupees per household per day  for doorstep  collection,  which  was  “completely  unsustainable  in  the  long  term” (Chikarmane, Narayan 2006, 47). The authors noted that the waste burden was less in wards where “PMC authorized waste‐pickers” collected dry waste, and the trucks accepted only wet waste (Chikarmane, Narayan 2006, 48), and suggested instituting a fee‐based doorstep collection service staffed by authorized waste‐pickers.   PMC’s prior  (1996)  recognition  of  waste‐pickers  was  useful  —  the  reference  to  waste‐pickers as “authorized” or ”PMC authorized” workers  throughout  the report was a nod  to  KKPKP’s  previous  accomplishments,  including  the  ongoing  doorstep collection  pilot.  The  document  outlined  various  reasons  why  it  was  difficult  to enforce  that  citizens give  segregated waste  to  the ghanta‐trucks.  For example,  the irregularity of the service timings led the residents to dispose of waste in municipal bins  instead,  and  PMC  workers  were  unwilling  or  unable  to  compel  residents  to keep waste segregated and lacked the incentive to do so since they didn’t stand to benefit  personally  (Chikarmane,  Narayan  2006,  49).  As  ghanta‐trucks  appeared inefficient in contrast to doorstep collectors, the authors suggested the alternative of fixed  feeder  points  where  waste‐pickers  would  hand  over  organic  waste  to municipal workers. The report even noted that this new system would not only be 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more cost‐effective, but would assist PMC’s compliance with the MSW 2000 Rules by utilizing  “cooperatives/organizations  of  waste‐pickers/self  help  groups/  informal service  providers”  to  better  meet  collection  and  recycling  requirements  while simultaneously promoting poverty  alleviation,  “also  the  statutory  responsibility of the municipality” (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2006, 54). Thus the report supported the notion  that  employing  waste‐pickers,  who  would  receive  payment  only  if  they performed their duties, to collect segregated waste directly from households was a superior collection system for a number of reasons.  The  recommendations  regarding  the  informal  sector  did  not  end  with  the suggestion  of  integrating  waste‐pickers  into  the  formal  collection  system.  The report  recommended  spaces  for  scrap  sorting,  storage  and  sale  in  the  city,  and suggested  the  potential  for  bio‐gas  to  deal  with  organic  waste,  and  promoted continued  waste‐picker  access  to  recyclables  by  declaring  that  “any  technology requires  a  particular  density  or  presence  of  combustible  recyclable waste will  be unsuitable,” a reference to the Refuse Derived Fuel plant under consideration by the city as a disposal technique (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2006, 56).  SWaCH staff asserted that it was advocacy and lobbying such as this that tipped the municipality towards funding the cooperative: “There was enough advocacy and lobbying done and there was  enough  data  to  prove  that  the  waste‐pickers’  role  in  the  whole  solid  waste management cannot be denied. It could be shown that the dry waste that they were recycling was definitely  reducing  the burden of  the Municipal Corporation, and so the  Corporation  obviously  had  no  choice  but  to  accept  the  services”  (Jog,  Pune, August 2009). This information, endorsed by a credible government institution such as AIILSG, was difficult  for officials at PMC to discard and ultimately  informed the administration’s  decisions  around  solid  waste  collection  and  disposal,  paving  the way for the formation of SWaCH.  The assessment also drew attention to gaps between policy and implementation on the  part  of  the  local  government  and  enumerated  various  reforms,  including  the reallocation of personnel,  the installation of more electronic weigh bridges, the re‐planning of fleet routes, consistent enforcement of segregation and disposal rules at 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the household level, and capacity building for municipal planners and implementers. PMC  had  not  yet  thoroughly  measured  or  documented  waste  generation  and collection  in  Pune;  the  study  clearly  influenced  the  administration’s  perspective, evinced  by  the  fact  that  the  data  regarding  the waste  burden  as well  as  the  cost‐savings  to  the  city  thanks  to waste‐pickers  are often  cited by officials  in  the  Solid Waste Management  and Health Departments  at  PMC  (Jagtap,  Pune,  August  2009).  The report also promoted separate waste streams for dry and wet waste, which was later institutionalized by PMC (Wavare, Pune, July 2009). Through its research and advocacy work in collaboration with AIILSG, KKPKP provided PMC with a mode for much needed reform in solid waste management by clarifying and documenting the existing system.   5. Capacity and buy‐in on the part of doorstep collectors KKPKP has been more successful at integrating the informal sector into formal solid waste management systems than some other organizations in India (Buddhe, Phone, July  2009,  Chengappa,  Phone,  August  2009).  The  less  successful  cases  frequently involved  NGOs  which  hadn’t  built  a  sufficient  rapport  with  the  informal  sector workers, or attempted to employ members of the urban poor who were not familiar with working with waste, or were not able to effectively organize the workers into a cohesive  group.  KKPKP,  by  contrast,  was  not  only  well‐organized  and  structured enough  to  propose  and  follow  through  on  the  cooperative  model,  but,  more importantly,  it  had  the  buy‐in  and  support  of  its members,  and  SWaCH  has  been careful  to  adequately  train  the  women  as  well  as  ensure  that  they  have  proper expectations of what the work will entail prior to beginning. While some programs that seek to employ the urban poor are subsidized in the sense that the workers are paid  for  their  training  time,  or  compensated  for  transportation  or  childcare,  this does  not  fit  with  KKPKP’s  philosophy.  The  union  staff  will  not  pursue  programs unless the members perceive them as beneficial enough for them to bear these costs themselves  (Narayan, Pune,  July 2009).  It was at open monthly meetings with  the KKPKP  members  that  the  union  decided  to  undertake  the  SWaCH  program,  and these  same  meetings  are  used  to  recruit  doorstep  collectors  (Jog,  Pune,  August 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2009). Because the union leaders had gauged waste‐picker interest and undertaken similar programs and capacity building, they had confidence that there was enough demand among their constituency, and enough faith in their decision processes, that a sufficient number of waste‐pickers would be willing to adjust to a service‐oriented occupation. The middle class activists were able to understand and push the needs and  concerns  of  waste‐pickers  so  effectively  because  they  had  successfully embedded  themselves  within  the  waste‐picker  community  for  at  least  3  years before  the  formalization  of  the  union,  “establishing  close  and  enduring  reciprocal relationships with the waste‐pickers“ (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 2). This shared history  of  mobilization,  complemented  by  the  long  years  of  experience,  research, advocacy and prior engagement with the local government, sustained participation in SWaCH going forward. Because the union undertook doorstep collection efforts in 1990 as well as in 2005 and then in 2007 with SWaCH, the program was developed gradually enough to convince waste‐pickers, who previously may not have realized first hand its benefits or felt comfortable with the required skills and processes, that it represented a sure avenue towards security and better working conditions.  The head staff at SWaCH described a relatively transparent job recruitment system that ensures that the women who apply for the jobs are properly matched and have a  full understanding of  the expectations of  the position. Recruitment of workers  is also geographically based: “We still go from community to community having meets with women who are not integrated yet, we ask them to come and become members in the system, and at the same time, whenever there is demand in a particular area” (Jog, Pune, August 2009). When citizens ask for SWaCH to serve their neighborhood, “we  contact  the  slum  in  that  area,  we  find  out  women  in  that  area,  we  have  a meeting with  them, we  go  and  show  them  the work…and only  then we quote  the rate…So  the women  see  the work,  they  decide what  kind  of  dry waste  they’ll  get from  there,  how  far  it  is  from  the municipal  system,  how much  they will  have  to travel  to  deposit  the  wet  waste  into  the  system,  so  after  all  that  is  seen  by  the women, they decide whether they will work or not, and then we integrate them into our system” (Jog, Pune, August 2009). The workers are given ample opportunity to 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weigh  the  costs  and benefits  for  themselves,  and no one  assumes  that  integration into the program is inherently preferable.  6. Degrees of formalization SWaCH gained a foothold in part because of KKPKP’s savvy negotiation of degrees of private versus public as well as  formal versus  informal. Though risky, at  times the blurring of boundaries between the private and public sectors has proven effective in  improving  public  service  provision  (Joshi,  Moore,  2004),  and  some  authors challenge the assumption that formalization is dualistic rather than a spectrum, and that it is by nature superior to informal status in the developing world (Sanyal 1996, Peattie  1980).  Just  as  KKPKP  blurs  the  boundaries  between  autonomous  and integrated in its relations with the State, SWaCH represents a gradual or partial shift from  public  to  private  and  informal  to  formal  by  offering  neither  traditional privatization  nor  traditional  public  service  provision.  Public  procurement  from groups  of  the  urban  poor  is  not  unusual  in  Pune,  though  it  is  new  in  waste (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). For example, the Pune Municipal Corporation, in fulfillment of  its commitment to pro‐poor  initiatives, purchases needed items such as  folders  and  school  uniforms  exclusively  from  Self  Help  Groups,  or  partially formalized  group  microenterprises  made  up  of  poor  women  within  the  city (Kalamkar,  Pune,  August  2009).  In  SWaCH’s  case  in  particular,  the  municipal government was fulfilling its directive of supporting poor entrepreneurs as well as taking  advantage  of  existing  informal  sector  mechanisms  for  waste  management and recycling.  In  creating  this  new  form  of  privatization,  the  SWaCH  system  also  protects  the ability of impoverished women who have worked in waste‐picking for years to gain the capital represented by recyclable scrap. As stated by a KKPKP founder, “SWaCH itself is a form of privatization…but it is a privatization model that is inclusive of the poor,  rather  than  excluding  them”  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009).  If  collection was privatized by the State, waste‐pickers would likely lose access to scrap as well as have no other option than to work for the companies, realistically at exploitative 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wage  rates and with  few rights or benefits  (Bahora, Pune,  July 2009). KKPKP also anticipated the risks of ‘panacea’ disposal technologies such as Refuse Derived Fuel in  displacing  waste‐pickers  by  discouraging  recycling  and  creating  a  closed collection system, and continues to argue that “the state is duty‐bound to protect the interests  of  those  affected,  displaced  and  marginalized  by  market  processes” (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2000, 3642).  Noted one of the founders:  “We believe that the door to door collection model should be separate and reserved  for  the  small  sector  and  not  be  taken  over  by  other  bodies because…even  if  the  other  bodies  do  take  it  over  like  they  did  in  Delhi, there is an integrated contract from collection to disposal, they are unable to  handle  the  intricacies  of  collection,  door  to  door  collection,  so  they actually  farm  it  out  to  NGOs  and  smaller  contractors  and  the  small contractors  hire  the  same  labor  at  exploitative  rates  and  do  the  same thing.    So  it  is  against  the  workers’  interest  to  enter  into  that  kind  of arrangement” (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009).  SWaCH’s distinction of being ‘poor inclusive’ accesses the useful skills and ambitions of  the  informal  sector  and  protects  the  waste‐pickers  by  preserving  their independence  from  exploitative  market  actors.  This  approach  is  evident  in  the cooperative’s  exploration  of  opportunities  for  other  income‐generating  tasks  that draw on the waste‐pickers’ skills and experience, such as managing composting and bio‐gas facilities, which requires a high level of segregation (Sreenivas, Pune, August 2009, Jog, Pune, July 2009). The creation and maintenance of non‐exploitative work opportunities for waste‐pickers is the central goal of SWaCH. The  use  of  contractors  for  waste  management  is  prevalent  in  India,  and  creates service  situations  that  are  difficult  for  the  informal  sector  and  its  advocates  to penetrate  or  subvert.  Development  workers  at  a  large  international  aid  NGO engaged  with  waste‐picker  needs  and  solid  waste  management  in  Nagpur  and Bangalore cited the difficulty in prompting a municipality to change its service and procurement  systems  where  private  sector  providers  are  already  in  place,  or achieving commitments  from those contractors  to equitably employ the  local poor (Buddhe, Phone,  July 2009, Chengappa, Phone, August 2009). One exception might be  the arrangement  in Latur, where  the waste‐pickers, municipal government and 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small contractors are working together in a non‐exploitative and mutually agreeable way.  Adhar  Sevabhawi  Sanstha  Latur,  a  waste‐picker  collective  since  1996  and member  the  National  Alliance  of  Waste‐Pickers  founded  by  KKPKP,  facilitates waste‐pickers  in  working  as  sub‐contractors  to  the  companies  handling  waste collection for the municipality. The Latur Municipal Corporation pays the contractor 650 Rupees per ton of mixed waste collected from households; the sub‐contractors who work the  tractor, collecting and sorting waste,  receive 145 Rupees per  ton  to split between them, as well as keep the profits from selling the scrap (Kamble, Pune, July 2009). The apparent success of the arrangement in Latur undoubtedly relies in part  on  the  city’s  geography,  disposition  of  local  government  as  well  as  private sector,  and  the presence of  a waste‐picker  advocacy group at  the  right  stage.  It  is also clearly driven by the fact that the contractor as well as sub‐contractors are paid by  the  municipality  based  on  the  quantity  of  waste,  in  tons,  collected  from  the households,  thus  incentivizing  good  performance.  It  presents  another  example  of the potential for quasi‐formalization to be more successful than outright corporate competition. The KKPKP leadership confirmed the value of gradual or partial formalization of the informal  sector.  The  early  union  organizers  focused  on  upgrading  the  occupation, rather than changing it; instead of completely formalizing the occupation by seeking positions  for  the  women  as  formal  waste  workers,  the  leaders  pursued  quasi‐formalization via the endorsement of the municipality, which resulted in improved rights  and  conditions without  sacrificing  flexibility  and  autonomy.  Staff  at  KKPKP offered a parallel example in the work of Hamal Panchayat. This pioneering informal sector union of porters, whose leader guided KKPKP in its early years, pushed for an Act  that  established  a  structure  to  provide  porters with  social  security.  By  taking levies from those who employ porters and contributing them towards benefits that are  then  claimed  by  registered  workers,  the  Hamal  Boards  create  an  employer‐employee  relationship  that  grants  security  and  equity,  but  does  not  represent “formalization  in  the  way  that  is  understood  in  terms  of  the  formal  sector” (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). The leaders of KKPKP saw the Hamal Panchayat 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model as an example of a way “to retain the benefits of the informal sector and yet reduce  the  exploitative  aspects  of  the  formal  sector”  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August 2009). According to  its President, Hamal Panchayat explicitly avoided the creation of  contract  relationships  between  porters  and  employers,  in  favor  of  a more  free structure  (Adhav,  Pune,  August  2009).  PMC  officials  influential  in  the  founding  of SWaCH also  favored quasi‐formal  arrangements when  integrating  the urban poor, recognizing that full  formalization could have bad effects because it requires small organizations of  the urban poor to compete on an unlevel playing field (Kalamkar, Pune,  August  2009).  KKPKP’s  adaptability  and  success  hinged  on  the  recognition that  the  informal  sector,  though  often  precarious  and  exploitative,  has  facets  of opportunity and flexibility that should not necessarily be sacrificed for more binding and  unfamiliar  arrangements.  Instead  of  trying  to  place waste‐pickers  in  existing formal  sector  jobs,  SWaCH  created  a  unique  position  which  drew  on  the  waste‐picker’s  particular  valuable  experience  while  improving  her  conditions,  while providing necessary support and capacity‐building. 7. Atypical privatization Related to the quasi‐formal character of the cooperative, SWaCH was also able to go forward  because  it  did  not  pose  a  threat  to  the  formal  sector waste management union, whereas privatization of waste collection and transport constituted a threat to  both  formal  and  informal  sector  unions,  and  was  strongly  opposed  by  both. KKPKP’s  founders  observed,  roughly  a  decade  after  the  formation  of  the  informal sector  union:  “The  Pune Municipal  Corporation  has  not  pursued  the  privatization through  the  contractors’  route  because  of  the  presence  of  a  strong  municipal workers union and an equally strong waste‐pickers union”  (Chikarmane, Narayan, 2004, 17). By authorizing and thus endorsing KKPKP’s cause, PMC strengthened the informal sector union and hindered  its own potential privatize  the  labor‐intensive aspects of waste management. A local environmental activist noted that the union of municipal  conservancy  workers  in  Pune  previously  blocked  the  introduction  of waste management techniques, such as mechanized street sweepers, in the interest of protecting  jobs  (Gadgil, Pune,  July 2009). Equally  crucial  is  the  fact  that KKPKP 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did not demand waste‐picker employment in the existing formal sector system; thus SWaCH does not present a  threat  to  formal municipal  solid waste employees who clearly would  otherwise  oppose  it.  This  is  another way  that  SWaCH  occupies  the gray area  in the  formal‐informal spectrum,  filling a gap without strong opposition. “The  fact  that  doorstep  collection  of  garbage  was  never  the  mandatory responsibility of  the municipalities  [previously] and  the prohibitive costs of hiring regular  labor  to  fulfill  that added responsibility, offers  the space  for waste‐pickers (through the KKPKP) to negotiate their claims for public‐private partnerships to fill the  gap  between  the  door‐step  and  the  common  collection  point,  without antagonizing  the municipal  unions”  (Chikarmane,  Narayan,  2004,  18).  KKPKP  did not have  to wrest doorstep  collection away  from another  company,  as has been a problem  in  other  cities where  collection  has  already  been  privatized  (Chengappa, Phone,  July  2009)  and  similarly,  SWaCH  was  formed  in  such  a  way  that  existing formal sector waste management workers were not threatened. While formal waste staff may oppose privatization or the direct hiring of waste‐pickers, the creation of a brand‐new organization and occupation that did not infringe on existing operations could  proceed  without  opposition  from  the  strong  formal  sector  conservancy worker union.  8. Urgency of the solid waste management crisis A clear crisis of performance further prompted the Pune Municipal Corporation to consider coproduction of services as an alternative. The protests of the villagers at Uruli Devachi, the current landfill, as well as the observation by the state Pollution Board that the landfill was not functioning properly, and PMC’s understanding that the city’s population and thus waste generated was only growing rapidly created a sense of urgency to find a solution. The state government’s Pollution Control Board has asserted that PMC is in violation of the waste disposal requirements of the MSW 2000 Rules (Gadgil, Pune, July 2009), and the city’s poor management of the landfill at  Uruli  Devachi  has  led  to widespread  criticism  from  citizens  as well  as  outright protests  from  villagers  adjacent  to  the  site.    According  to  municipal  officials,  in response to  the pollution surrounding the  landfill, which was  in operation  for  two 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decades,  the  residents  of  Uruli  Devachi  agitated  for  its  closure,  giving  the municipality  several  months  to  permanently  cease  dumping  (Nikam,  Pune,  July 2009,  Jagtap,  Pune,  July  2009).  While  this  ongoing  pressure  motivated  PMC  to consider  and  institute  a  portfolio  of  waste  management  approaches,  from decentralized  bio‐gas  plants  and  vermiculture,  to  Refuse  Derived  Fuel  plants,  it simultaneously  heightened  the  administration’s  reliance  on  SWaCH.  Solid  Waste officials  at  PMC  saw  SWaCH  as  a  crucial  ally  in  addressing  the  waste  crisis  and shoring  up  the  city's  deteriorating  reputation  with  the  public  (Jog,  Pune,  August 2009).  Given  the  problems  at  the  landfill  and  the  prospect  of  unabated  waste generation,  if  SWaCH  were  to  discontinue  service  to  the  tens  of  thousands  of households  it  currently  serves, PMC’s  credibility would  suffer a  tremendous blow. SWaCH staff saw the problem at Uruli Devachi as assisting the young enterprise by reinforcing a reciprocal relationship of dependency, and a sense of urgency on the part of PMC that SWaCH close the gaps in household participation and coverage. The publicity around the crisis also made citizens and officials  in the  local wards more amendable to cooperating with the doorstep collection efforts (Jog, Pune, July 2009).  Thus while the gross mismanagement of waste created the conditions  in which an innovative solution such as SWaCH was needed, the outcry regarding Uruli Devachi also enhanced demand for the program.   9. Affordability from the perspective of the municipality It was in this context that KKPKP created a proposal that was more cost‐effective for PMC than privatization, requiring only a relatively small financial investment for the first  5  years,  followed  by  continued  cooperation  and  provision  of  PMC  service infrastructure. At the end of the term of funding in 2012, SWaCH will emerge as an independent cooperative  that operates on  fees collected  from the households. The arrangement  clearly  holds  appeal  as  an  alternative  to  a  private  contract arrangement  that  would  require  ongoing  payments  from  the  city.  Thus,  from  the perspective of PMC, SWaCH represents an opportunity for a cheap and sustainable method of materially reducing the burden of solid waste on PMC — something that is very prescient and critical, with the closing of Uruli Devachi and public resistance 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to  building  more  landfills  on  rural  land  (Gadgil,  Pune,  July  2009).  Contrary  to  a common criticism of service privatization, accountability will be maintained as the municipality will not be able to retreat, but will remain involved in SWaCH because of  the  necessary  communication  between  PMC  employees  and  SWaCH  staff  and collectors, and PMC’s pledge of continued infrastructure such as carts, boots, gloves and masks.   One of KKPKP’s  arguments  for  instituting SWaCH was  that  individual doorstep  collectors  increase  accountability  of  waste  generators  for  source segregation as well as fees; this was appealing to PMC because waste‐pickers would be  responsible  for  collecting  controversial  fee  from  households,  which  was  the lynch‐pin of this model.  SWaCH thus addresses not only a service provision gap, but also  a  funding  gap,  by  tapping  citizens  for  the  funds  to  assist  the  over‐stretched municipality in improving waste management. 10. Presence of reformist bureaucrats Finally  SWaCH  was  able  to  go  forward  despite  controversy  from  other  elected officials  and  the  public  in  part  due  to  champions  such  as  the  Municipal Commissioner and the Joint Municipal Commissioner who were willing to interpret their  responsibilities  in  a  way  that  supported  the  KKPKP  initiative.  The  project benefited  from  the  support  of  high‐ranking  officials within  the Urban  Community Development  Department  who  sincerely  believed  in  the  poverty  alleviation  and empowerment goals of the department, and in the importance of the inclusion of the urban  poor  in  formal  market  and  governance  processes.  Such  officials  were instrumental  in  securing  the  agreement  with  KKPKP  to  fund  SWaCH.  The  Joint Municipal  Commissioner  and  head  of  the  Urban  Community  Development Department was  involved  in  drafting  the  contract  that  established  and  registered SWaCH  (Kalamkar,  Pune,  August  2009),  but willingly  relinquished  the  bulk  of  his involvement  at  the  insistence  of  the  vocal  opposition  (Narayan,  Phone,  February 2010).  Not only was the initial support of powerful officials crucial; their willingness to put the  initiative  before  personal  interest  and  remain  flexible  under  intense  scrutiny 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and  criticism  may  have  ultimately  preserved  the  project.  Similarly,  SWaCH  was saved  from  dissolution  at  the  last  moment  by  the  Municipal  Commissioner’s willingness to appeal to a higher level of government. A local activist experienced in environmental issues and government accountability in Pune credited the success of KKPKP in part to the presence of “an administrative head who was sympathetic to the  cause  of  waste‐pickers” who was willing  to  take  political  risks  to  get  SWaCH implemented (Gadgil, Pune, July 2009). A common theme of the interviews was also that “PMC is not a monolithic structure”—highlighting the fact that KKPKP was not negotiating with it as an institution per se, but with specific individuals, some who were more sympathetic than others (Narayan, Pune, July 2009) and boosted in the ability  of  the  union  to  succeed.  “In  2007  the  PMC  once  again  made  history  by resolving  to support an  integration model outside  the contracting  framework. The General  Body  Resolution  in  Pune  was  preceded  by  a  pilot  to  scale  that  drew legitimacy  from  authorization  given  by  the  Municipal  Commissioner  using  his powers  under  the  BPMC  Act”  (SNDT,  Chintan,  2008,  17).  The  Municipal Commissioner  and  Joint  Municipal  Commissioner  both  enacted  their  roles supportively and consistently, despite political pressure, and were unique in rising to  the  expectations  placed  on  them  by  society  as  well  as  higher  levels  of government, for example by engaging stakeholders in drafting the City Development Plan  (Gadgil,  Pune,  July  2009).  Thus  the  accomplishment  of  SWaCH  was  clearly enabled  by  progressive  officials  who  saw  the  value  of  KKPKP’s  contribution  to society as well as demonstrated a commitment to fulfill their duties exceptionally.  In this chapter I explored and highlighted the important contextual as well as internal organizational aspects that positioned KKPKP to successfully suggest and implement the SWaCH cooperative.  In the following chapter, I will describe a selection of obstacles and limitations that need to be acknowledged and surmounted in order for SWaCH to be successful in the future. 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Chapter 3: Future Challenges to SWaCH: Obstacles to Sustainability My  research  drew  out  various  challenges  that  SWaCH  will  face  in  the  oncoming years: the possibility that privatization, possibly incompatible with SWaCH, will still be  pursued;  the  question  of  whether  SWaCH  can  continue  to  provide  effective service  and‐‐if  it  remains  the  only  doorstep  collection  provider‐‐avoid  the drawbacks  of  a  monopoly;  and  the  need  for  increased  buy‐in  of  the  citizenry, particularly  in  terms  of  their  willingness  to  pay  for  a  doorstep  collection  service from women who may  not  yet  have  strong  customer  service  skills.  These  lessons and  discussions will  be  useful  in  highlighting  important  considerations  regarding how this model might be scaled up across India or other urban communities in the developing world. 
The continued threat of privatization Despite the appropriateness of the SWaCH mechanism, the increasing generation of waste  in  Pune  and  the  lack  of  consistency  in  government  implementation  in addressing it perpetuates the threat of privatization of solid waste management and the  displacement  of  waste‐pickers.  Even  municipal  representatives  supportive  of SWaCH  offered  the  tendering  of  solid  waste  management  to  contractors  as  a possible  solution  to  the  time‐sensitive  crisis  (Nikam, Pune,  July 2009). A doorstep collection  system,  whether  or  not  SWaCH  administers  it,  can  only  permit  the collection of waste directly from households. If PMC brings in private sector actors to  handle  collection  and  transport,  the  waste‐pickers  will  be  on  the  outside  of  a closed waste system. Additionally, staff at KKPKP are concerned that if PMC pursues alternative methods of disposal that do not encourage recycling—there are already two privately‐operated Refuse Derived Fuel  plants  at Uruli Devachi  (Jagtap,  Pune, July  2009)—waste‐picker  livelihoods  will  be  endangered  (Narayan,  Pune,  July 2009). Thus it is crucial that SWaCH demonstrate and establish that it can and will meet solid waste management needs and that  the benefits of  the system outweigh the potential costs of not pursuing other approaches to collection and disposal. 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Decisions  from  above  regarding  solid  waste  management  pose  a  threat  as  well. While SWaCH enjoys support within government, national level decisions regarding appropriate  technologies  and  facilities  are  often  made  without  cohesion  across governing bodies. For example,  the existing RDF  facilities  in Pune were  funded by the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM): The “Ministry of Urban Development, which is infrastructure, is going right ahead and funding large infrastructure  even  in  waste  management  without…understanding  or  hearing people  out  from  the  urban  poverty  alleviation  sector”  (Menon,  Pune,  July  2009).  Government bodies that are less connected to the work of KKPKP on the ground in Pune  may  make  decisions  without  considering  local  appropriateness  despite  the existence of advocates on various levels. Environmental activists in Pune suggested that government decisions are often based on the availability of funds, rather than a discussion of costs and benefits, and that those selling waste‐to‐energy as a solution are  persistent  (Gadgil,  Pune,  July  2009,  Menon,  Pune,  July  2009).  While  some departments are on board with KKPKP’s “empowerment thinking,” there are many in Indian government who are not, making it easier for vested interests to influence decision‐making  (Menon,  Pune,  July  2009).  This  inconsistency  at  various  levels  of the State is an obstacle to be considered. An important way to surmount the threat of privatization is for SWaCH to clarify the fact that it, too, can improve services and keep costs low through competition, as is frequently  touted  by  supporters  of  privatization  and  pluralization.    In  this  case, because  Pune  Municipal  Corporation  has  not  actually  privatized  solid  waste management,  that  is,  has  not  completely  relinquished  responsibility  for  waste management  nor  guaranteed  SWaCH  a  contract  indefinitely,  performance‐enhancing competition  still  exists.    SWaCH and KKPKP have already  responded  to the  criticism  from  certain  officials  and  groups  in  Pune  that  their  arrangement constitutes  a  monopoly  on  doorstep  collection.  KKPKP  leaders  asserted  that  the centralized form of SWaCH is something that is necessary now, but could be altered in  the  future:  “SWaCH  is  trying  to  bridge  the  transition…formalize  the  informal, therefore consolidation is necessary, because there is certain investment in terms of 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data, in terms of training, in terms of management, that is best done centralized for it  to be cost‐effective”  (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2000). At  this  stage,  centralized administration is more intuitive and efficient, but the staff acknowledged that a way to  ensure  accountability  and  good  performance  is  to  become  polycentric  as  the organization becomes larger and covers more households. The monopoly issue will be  removed  when  SWaCH  becomes  a  federation,  with  numerous  “small entrepreneurial  units,”  at  below  the ward  level  (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). Though  skeptical  of  PMC’s  true  motivation  for  monopoly  accusations,  KKPKP’s leaders remain committed to “good services…that are accountable to citizens…and services  that  are  fair  to  labor”  (Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009).  Monopolies become  a  problem  when  they  are  not  accountable  to  consumers  and  their  own workers. An ongoing theme of this article is that organizing the informal sector as a mass  group  can  be  an  important  first  step.  Once  that  structure  is  built,  like  the importance of multiple linkages, multiple centers can ensure that the organization’s growth  is  sustainable  and  accountable.    KKPKP’s  demonstrated  adaptability  will greatly support this. 
Worker buy­in and innovation SWaCH  represents  a  cost‐effective  solid waste management  solution  for PMC  that also  has  great  potential  to  reduce  the  need  for  welfare  interventions  by  the municipality  among  the  urban  poor.  A  local  activist  noted  that  because  SWaCH  is pro‐poor, “this is a type of privatization which probably will be more sustainable, in the social sense as well”  (Menon, Pune,  July 2009). Two doorstep collectors, while they were not members of KKPKP prior  to  joining  SWaCH, described  the work  as desirable compared to the domestic housework they were undertaking previously, and  reported  working  directly  with  waste  already—a  position  as  a  doorstep collector seemed like a  logical transition (Bagul, Acumite, Pune, August 2009). The existing sense of allegiance among KKPKP members and their relevant skills create demand and promote the sustainability of the cooperative. The work of a doorstep collector is often not easy, but the provision of tools, the predictability of the work, and the relative authority it endows makes the conditions better than picking waste 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from  public  bins,  and  even  preferable  to  other  informal  sector  positions,  such  as washing laundry or utensils (Bagul, Acumite, Pune, August 2009). Only the number of households participating in the program dictates the need for additional doorstep collectors;  Pune  is  so  populous  that  positions  for  doorstep  collectors  (or  in  other value‐added  services  such  as  composting,  biogas  or  vermiculture  management) could be virtually  limitless (Jog, Pune,  July 2009). The women working  for SWaCH also indicated they would be happy to contribute to the future sustainability of the cooperative,  if  they were  to  earn  enough  to qualify  (Bagul, Acumite,  Pune, August 2009).  These facts indicate that SWaCH and KKPKP both build feelings of solidarity and  community,  and  that  the  workers  see  clear  benefits  to  participation.  This evidence supports the argument that though SWaCH is not currently serving every single  household  in  Pune,  its  capacity  to  do  so  is  not  restricted  by  its workforce. Similarly,  the  fact  that  the  members  of  KKPKP  have  emphasized  that  they  are interested  in  improved  occupations,  not  simply  exit  strategies,  means  the opportunity  to  graduate  from waste‐picker  to  service  provider  will  likely  remain attractive.   
The need for consumer buy­in and service worker capacity building That the costs of the program, aside from the initial promised start‐up funders, are charged to the citizen directly makes SWaCH attractive to PMC; paying for doorstep collection  services  via  a  fee  paid  directly  from  the  household  likewise  increases accountability  on  the  part  of  the  provider  as  well  as  the  payee.  “Accountability relationships  between  the  key  stakeholders  in  service  delivery  —  citizens, policymakers and service providers — are not transparent, formalized or effective,” because  “policymakers…do  not  have  effective  ways  of  holding  service  providers accountable,” and likewise, “in most polities there are few mechanisms for citizens to hold service providers directly accountable for service delivery” (Joshi, 2008, 12). In  those cases,  contractors may continue  to be paid  for services  that are  less  than adequate. In the SWaCH situation, if the collector does not accomplish her task, she doesn’t receive her fee; thus there is a strong impetus for the worker to do her job properly.  The World Bank recommends the “‘short route’ of accountability (directly 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between citizens and providers)” as opposed to the more traditional, electoral ‘long route’  of  accountability,  that  is,  “citizens  electing  policymakers  who  fail  to  check providers”  (Joshi,  2008,  12).  Staff  at  SWaCH  argued  that  the  fee  system must  be adhered  to,  instead of  “another parallel municipal corporation system, where  they get  a  fixed  salary…SWaCH  feels  that  it  is  better  if  the  citizens  pay  the  women directly,”  also  because  it  allows  the  household  members  to  directly  witness  and understand  the  work  the  collectors  are  doing  (Jog,  Pune,  July  2009).  This  aspect points to the superiority and importance of a system where the service provider and citizen interact closely on a regular basis.  However, this system cannot function without sufficient participation on the part of the  greater  citizenry,  which  in  turn  requires  some  amount  of  political  will  from government  representatives  to  encourage,  and  if  necessary,  enforce  participation. Though  decentralization  is  often  key  to  coproduction,  it  can  be  challenging  to achieve  effectively,  especially  in  governments  such as  India which have  long been characterized  by  weak  “signals  encouraging  citizen  input”  and  where  “the importance of central control and direction has dominated official thinking since the end of colonialism” (Ostrom, 1996, 1081).  Convincing citizens  to pay  the monthly  fee also entails building an appreciation of the  mission  of  SWaCH  and  the  work  of  the  informal  sector  workers,  as  well  as enhancing  those workers’  capacity  as  service  providers.  In  fact,  attempting  direct enforcement on the part of the local government could be disastrous—perhaps why government at the ward level, specifically councilors and health officials, have been reluctant  to  penalize  citizens  who  fail  to  pay  (Jog,  Pune,  July  2009).    For  this  to occur,  the municipal  government needs  to be more proactive  and  supportive,  and fulfill  its  agreements  to SWaCH—for example, providing  the promised  fee  subsidy for  households  in  slums  to  receive  the  doorstep  collection  service.  KKPKP  staff noted  that  not  all  households  have  to  pay  for  services  in  a  neighborhood  for everyone to receive the benefits of collection, but “it has to be more people moving towards  payment,  and  just  a  nominal  minority  not  paying…One  needs  to  use  a multiplicity  of  incentives  and  penalties  to  get  citizens  to  comply with  something” 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(Chikarmane,  Pune,  August  2009).  If  the  households  don’t  pay,  the  waste‐picker loses income and doorstep collection becomes less attractive than picking from the bins  (Jog, Pune,  July 2009). This  trade‐off  is  likely more heightened  in slum areas, which tend to generate more wet waste, which is heavier. This makes the job both more difficult for doorstep collectors, and less financially rewarding in terms of the collection of scrap.  Thus it is particularly problematic that PMC has not delivered on their agreement  to  subsidize doorstep collection by 50%  for households  in  slums. Though SWaCH and PMC have laid a strong foundation for successful coproduction of a more efficient, ecological and equitable system of solid waste management, it is yet to be seen if PMC is willing to send the proper signals to households. Though the government might attempt to mandate accountability on the part of the waste  generator,  this  type of  face‐to‐face  service provision  is most  effective when there  is  mutual  trust  and  appreciation  between  the  service  provider  and  the consumer  (Tendler,  Freedheim,  1994).  In  the  case  of  SWaCH,  trust  is  diminished when  the waste  generator  obeys  in  segregating  her waste,  and  then  observes  the waste‐picker  throwing  the  carefully  segregated wet waste  into  a municipal waste bin as occurs in some places where a feeder system is not in place. “The municipality needs  to…ensure  that  the  streams  are  maintained  because  consumers  are  more willing  to  segregate when  they  see  that  the  separate  streams  are maintained  and they benefit”  (Chikarmane, Pune, August 2009). These  flaws  in  the system are not the only disincentives. Many residents resent the new system because they see solid waste  management  as  a  responsibility  of  the  municipal  government,  which  they should not be forced to pay extra for, even if the result is a superior system, socially as well  as  environmentally  (Gadgil,  Pune,  July  2009).  PMC  should  ensure  that  the proper  facilities are  in place and needs  to  increase either outreach or penalties  to improve citizen participation.  The SWaCH staff cited examples of wards where coverage has been strong thanks to better education and enforcement in regards to citizens and their role in paying and segregating. “Now that the Aundh office has taken a stand like this now the citizens have  no  choice  left  but  to  segregate  and  start  disposing  their  own  waste  and 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participating  in  the  waste  disposal  system”  (Jog,  Pune,  July  2009).    Furthermore, representatives  of  PMC  have  hitherto  seemed  reluctant  to  properly  educate  the public of the fact that without SWaCH PMC would not be able to effectively serve the entire city,  for reasons perhaps of pride as much as politics (Jog, Pune,  July 2009). The  program  cannot  be  implemented  very  successfully  without  buy‐in  from  the municipal employees. If the residents in the ward are “not positive about our role,” it is understandably harder to get the “municipal corporation officers in that ward” to cooperate with SWaCH (Jog, Pune, July 2009). The waste‐picker as a mechanism of citizen accountability  is only so useful  if  the government  is not willing to act on the  information  she  relays—that  is,  penalize  and  educate  households who  do  not pay or properly segregate.  The  creation  of  citizen  buy‐in  also  requires  building  rapport  between  doorstep collectors  and  the  public,  or  effectively  shoring  up  the  recent  erosion  of  citizen sympathy for waste‐pickers.  As stated by one of the founders: We had suspected this would happen.  When we started work 10 years, 15 years  ago,  waste‐pickers  were  collecting  waste  from  the  bins  and containers  and were  not  interfacing with  citizens  on  a  daily  basis  at  all.  It’s very easy for any service recipient like a middle class citizen to…feel a sympathy factor for them. But, when the person starts going to their house every day and  is offering a service where punctuality and regularity and behaving in a particular way is expected and they find that they are…not living up to every single part of it, then what becomes more important to them is not that they too are violating this kind of contract in many ways, the  citizens  themselves,  but  what's  important  is  that  this  person  is  not sticking to a commitment, and therefore they are not looking at the larger picture  anymore…Right  now  definitely  there  is  a  lot much more  strong, let's say criticism or opposition to waste‐pickers about small things to do with their actual work habits (Narayan, Pune, July 2009).  This declining sympathy  is one of  the trade‐offs of organization and formalization.  In  allying  with  the  municipality  in  order  to  form  SWaCH,  distrust  may  replace sympathy, as the interests of the waste‐picker turned doorstep collector now appear at  odds with  the  interests  of  the middle‐class  resident  being  asked  to  pay.  If  and when true citizen buy‐in occurs, only then will PMC fully realize the true benefits of the  SWaCH  collaboration.  Public  and  private  sector  synergy,  as  opposed  to  either 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group attempting to work alone, can be an effective development strategy because “the actions of public agencies facilitate forging norms of trust and networks of civic engagement  among  ordinary  citizens  and  using  these  norms  and  networks  for developmental ends. Engaged citizens are a source of discipline and information for public agencies as well as on‐the‐ground assistance in the implementation of public projects”(Evans, 1996, 1034).  Evans also raises the potential challenge of consumer buy‐in: “The effective delivery (or coproduction) of public services is only valued if citizens  reactions  make  a  difference  in  the  eyes  of  government  leaders”  (Evans, 1996,  1129).  The  predominance  of  citizens who  see waste‐pickers  as  contrary  to their personal goals is very real. This must be amended for SWaCH to succeed in the long term.  SWaCH’s response is to increase the capacity of the women as service providers and reduce  individual‐level  conflict  between  collector  and  consumer.  “We  also  have  a very  big  training  component  in  our work…they  have  to  go  on  time,  they  have  to dress neatly, they have to talk courteously” (Jog, Pune, July 2009). SWaCH staff also aim  to  train  the  collectors  to  understand  their  importance  in  the  larger  system—before  they  had  one  purpose,  to  generate  income,  whereas  now  they  are “contributing to the waste management chain” (Jog, Pune, 2009). Though the social orientation  of  SWaCH  is  one  of  its  clear  benefits,  and  a marketing  opportunity  to bring  community members  on  board,  SWaCH  is  foremost  a  service  provider,  and must offer  something  that  is worth paying  for  in order  to  remain competitive and sustainable,  a  point  that  is  not  lost  on  its  CEO  (Bahora,  Pune,  July  2009).  This  is another development aim of SWaCH,  to  create a mechanism of  income generation and improved status that does not rely on charity or sympathy alone.   In the conclusion that follows I will clarify the capacity of SWaCH to overcome these challenges  and  obstacles,  because  of  the  unique  adaptability  and  capacity  for innovation it  inherited from its parent organization of KKPKP. I will also draw out some replicable lessons for similar endeavors in the cities of the developing world. 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Chapter 4: Conclusions The  purpose  of  this  paper  was  not  only  to  understand  how  the  integration  of informal  sector  waste  workers  into  formal  processes  can  have  great  social, economic  and  environmental  pay‐offs,  but  also  how  this  integration  might  be achieved.  To  that  end,  I  have  discussed  the  key  organizations,  institutions  and individuals who shaped the 20‐year trajectory of the waste‐picker union, KKPKP, as well  as  fostered  the  recent  emergence  of  SWaCH,  the  flagship  cooperative  solid waste  service  provider  created  in  collaboration  with  the  Pune  Municipal Corporation. In the beginning, SNDT Women’s University was clearly important in supporting the activists,  Poornima  Chikarmane  and  Lakshmi  Narayan, who  came  to  organize  the local waste‐picker  population  and mobilize  them  into  an  effective  and  prominent union. By sustaining the early project with monetary resources and later lending the union’s  lobbying  work  the  added  credibility  of  an  academic  institution,  the university  created  a  space  in  which  the  relationships  that  built  the  organization, between  the waste‐pickers  and  activists,  as well  as  between  the nascent  program and other dominant institutions, could be formed.  A  second  important  foundation  for  the  SWaCH  partnership  was  the  union’s engagement,  early  on,  of  the  Pune  Municipal  Corporation.  By  immediately  and persistently  seeking  recognition  and  endorsement  of  waste‐pickers  as  workers, KKPKP achieved greater social acceptance  for  its members and built  ties with key actors  within  the  corporation.  The  negotiation  of  these  ties  enabled  the  union’s great volume of achievements,  from access to benefits such as health insurance, to improved income and agency via the cooperative scrap shop, to the later creation of the doorstep collection enterprise of SWaCH that would grant  tens of hundreds of waste‐pickers  enhanced  and  stable  occupations.  Unlike  many  NGOs  who  eschew engaging with government out of a  fear of becoming bureaucratized and co‐opted by  the  State  (Sanyal,  1997),  KKPKP  proactively  forged  a  productive  relationship 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with  the  municipal  government,  maintaining  autonomy  as  well  as  reciprocity through the simultaneous approaches of agitation and appeal. Through its fieldwork and publications, KKPKP clarified the economic and environmental contributions of waste‐pickers in municipal operations, and developed this evidence to illustrate an even  more  productive  mechanism  for  improvement  and  reform  of  solid  waste management, embodied by SWaCH. Central  to  all  of  this  was  KKPKP’s  sequential  and  incremental  approach  to  social improvement,  which  instead  of  employing  predetermined  assumptions  about  the needs of its constituents, actively engaged them in establishing the union’s activities and  goals  and  drew  on  their  knowledge  and  experience  to  implement  them.  KKPKP’s  leaders  remained open and agile  in engaging with external opportunities and barriers. Rooted in the experiences of its members, the union collaborated with a  range  of  institutions,  and  its  leaders  immersed  themselves  in  various  projects, from  doorstep  collection  pilots,  to  understanding  urban  waste  generation  and management,  to  explorations  of  the  environmental  impacts  of  various  service approaches, which  established  credibility  as well  as built  capacity  to  respond and evolve. Because of this crucial knowledge and field experience, and the strength of its relationships which were formed via contestation as much as academic research and  diplomacy,  the  union was well‐poised  to  propose  the  organization  of  SWaCH and publicly demonstrate its efficacy and worth. The fact that numerous simultaneous factors were at play in the course of KKPKP’s development  confirms  that  processes  such  as  the  successful  institution  of  SWaCH are non‐linear. One of  the  key  conditions  that  supported  the  formation of  SWaCH was  the  institution  of  the  MSW  2000  Rules  by  the  Central  Government  of  India, which  assisted  in  creating  both  the  perceived  need  and  an  entry  point  for  the organized informal sector workers to  fill a gap in municipal service provision. The Rules,  which  KKPKP  itself  helped  shape,  generated  a  space  in  which  the  State, KKPKP  and  the  greater  community  could  negotiate  and  devise  a  solid  waste management  response  which  increased  financial  sustainability  as  well  as  created multiple  layers  of  accountability,  and  the will within  the  local  government  to  act. 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This  process  led  to  the  innovation  of  SWaCH  because  sectorally  knowledgeable groups such as KKPKP were drawn in as grass‐roots experts on informal solid waste management  and  as  qualified  service  intermediaries.  Enlightened  bureaucrats within  the Pune Municipal Corporation  collaborated with  these  groups  to  actively shape the implementation and design of the program that became SWaCH. What are the implications of this story for urban planners? Planners have long been preoccupied with  effective public  service provision. The various  approaches,  from monolithic State provision, to pluralization, to privatization, have proved to contain various drawbacks and limits to accountability and efficiency (Joshi, Moore, 2004). Though  many  have  discarded  the  public‐private  partnership  model  as  reducing autonomy  as  well  as  accountability,  this  case  highlights  the  possibility  of  fruitful collaboration between the informal sector and municipal governments to coproduce and  provide  crucial  public  services.  Many  have  acknowledged  that  the  informal sector presents  a  frequently  ignored and untapped  resource  for  the public  sector, not just for the labor it provides, but also for its expertise and knowledge (Ostrom, 1996). Similarly, while the State is often over‐extended, the involvement of planners in the informal sector is necessary, as neither the market nor the community alone can create substantial  improvements in livelihoods and security (Sanyal, 2008). As poverty  alleviation  and  service  provision  are  primary  concerns  of  planners  in developing  countries,  the  SWaCH  case  is  extremely  useful  in  devising  future approaches that can address both, in a cost‐effective and socially equitable way.   This case study confirms various suggestions in the literature that to this point have lacked  clear  and  compelling  examples  of  success,  and  thus  offers  some  lesson  for policy  development.  First,  it  demonstrates  the  value  of  partial  or  gradual formalization  of  existing  groups,  drawing  on  informal  sector  mechanisms  and resources  without  pushing  the  members  into  unfamiliar  or  constrictive arrangements.  The  fact  that  the  informal  sector  is  present  everywhere  in  India,  if not the entire developing world,  is a compelling argument for gradually scaling up solutions such as the SWaCH arrangement. Social capital and “‘soft technologies’ of institutional  change  can  produce  results  well  out  of  proportion  to  the  resources 
 71 
required to implement them” (Evans, 1996, 1034). A vast workforce contributing to municipal coproduction  in such a way that  the benefits  far outweigh the costs  is a tremendous  resource.  One  lesson  provided  by  KKPKP  and  SWaCH  is  that  this vulnerable  and marginalized workforce  can be  successfully  integrated  into  formal systems for the betterment of both.  Integration of  the  informal  sector  into municipal  service provision works, but  this paper also demonstrates the particular effectiveness of an organization that fosters a multitude of linkages and approaches. KKPKP was so successful due to its ability to recognize  and  leverage  various  incentives  and  apply  a  variety  of  advocacy  and lobbying  approaches,  all  while  maintaining  a  direct  connection  to  its  grassroots, mass base. This case also suggests unique aspects of the organization that enhanced these  familiar  approaches,  including:  a  lack  of  political  affiliation;  vigilance regarding  the  perspectives  of  groups  other  than  the  target  population;  and  a willingness  of  the  institution  to  become polycentric,  as  evinced by  the  creation of the SWaCH cooperative as a separate, jointly forged entity. These features promote innovation instead of stagnation and ease the negotiation of the system changes that are necessary to effective service provision as well as pro‐poor development.  While a commitment to poverty alleviation on the part of local government clearly aided  this  collaboration,  more  important  was  the  push  to  meet  quantifiable  and well‐defined mandates from above. The fact that PMC met these standards with the assistance of a waste‐picker union is compelling, as few examples exist of attempts to  tap  the  informal  sector  in  fulfilling  local  government  responsibilities. While  the Pune context, and the qualities of the individuals involved, such as NGO leaders and municipal  officials,  clearly  played  a  role,  this  case  shows  that  they  are  not  the primary  determinants.  It  is  far  more  important  for  planners  to  promote organizations  and  processes  that  enable  cross‐sectoral  collaboration  and  political buy‐in to achieve the twin goals of improved basic services and social development.  The goal of this case study is ultimately to stimulate discussion and examination not solely for the pressing problem of solid waste management in developing countries, 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but  other  areas  of  goods  and  services  where  the  informal  sector  has  been stockpiling  expertise  for  generations,  but  is  still  overwhelming  ignored  and frequently underserved. Clearly, planners need to continue to examine and identify ways  in  which  the  informal  sector  can  complement  public  service  provision,  and how  the  skills  and  expertise  of  the  informal  sector  as well  as  civil  society  can  be harnessed to not only improve the State’s ability to meet its responsibilities, but to also upgrade conditions and livelihoods for precisely those citizens. 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